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COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
AND COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING:
BALANCING COMMUNITY
EMPOWERMENT AND
THE POLICE POWER
Patricia E. Salkin and Amy Lavine*
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the states have empowered local governments
to develop plans and implement regulations for neighborhood
and community development. When accomplished at the local or
regional level, the interests and benefits of the community as a
whole are to be weighed against the detriments to individuals.
Much has been studied and written about the lack of meaningful
public participation in the planning and land use regulatory
process, suggesting that often low-income and minority
communities are not fully engaged in the process, even when it
may result in decisions negatively impacting their
neighborhoods.1 Case studies have also shown that governments

* Patricia E. Salkin is the Associate Dean, Director of the Government
Law Center and the Raymond & Ella Smith Distinguished Professor of Law
at Albany Law School. Amy Lavine is a staff attorney at the Government
Law Center and the author of the Community Benefits Blog
http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com.
1
See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive
Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the
Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 831–837 (1998);
Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning
in Land Use Decisions Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 15–36
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho I]. It should also be noted that planning and

157

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597275

SALKIN REVISED.DOC

158

4/26/2010 11:32 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

are sometimes so eager to stimulate local economic development
that they fail to fully engage communities in the project review
process, both to expedite development and to avoid confronting
2
local opposition. This emphasis on short-term economic growth,
however, may obscure a local government’s perception of the
social and environmental needs of particular communities. When
this occurs, formal planning processes have failed to accomplish
their goals of engaging community members and guiding future
growth in a manner that maximizes long-term benefits for the
common good.

zoning boards tend to be composed of community elites, who often have ties
to the development sector. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING
SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 7–13 (2002) [hereinafter, GROWING SMART
LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK]. See generally, Jerry L. Anderson, Is the Wheel
Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning Boards, 36 URB. LAW. 447 (2004)
(arguing that bias pervades zoning boards in favor of entrenched interests).
The lack of socioeconomic diversity is particularly acute in larger cities,
which
results
in
“a
pronounced
bias
toward
the
professional/technical/managerial class in our cities.” Id. at 464; see also
Jerry L. Anderson, A Study of American Zoning Board Composition and
Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues (Apr. 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119582. But see Wayne Senville, Survey of
Planning Board Members Enlightening (Oct. 2002), http://www.planetizen.
com/node/66 (suggesting, in a less scientific survey, that greater diversity is
being achieved on planning board).
2
For example, plans for the Melrose Commons redevelopment project in
the South Bronx were initially formed without community involvement, and
they were poorly coordinated with the community’s needs. Changes were
made only after residents organized and presented their concerns to planning
officials. Eventually, the community’s initiative led to substantial
modifications, and the project is today viewed as a success. See SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES NETWORK CASE STUDIES, URBAN RENEWAL in MELROSE
COMMONS, (Sept. 18, 1996), http://www.sustainable.org/casestudies/
newyork/NY_af_melrose.html; see also Amy Wideman, Replacing Politics
with Democracy: A Proposal for Community Planning in New York City and
Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 197 (2002) (describing New York City’s
response to a community-based plan as “focus[ing] inordinately on economic
repercussions for the city and what the city’s role and expenses would be in
implementing aspects of the plan that could inhibit future industrial sitings in
the neighborhood”).
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New approaches to planning provide one response to
systemic public participation problems. The environmental
justice movement, for example, has sought to ensure a fair
distribution of both environmental burdens and environmental
goods by requiring local governments to make meaningful public
participation available to all community members. Communitybased planning efforts have attempted to improve the planning
process by focusing on small and distinct geographic areas and
by developing collaborative and inclusive planning programs.
Since the late 1990s, community benefits agreements (CBAs)
have offered another method to increase community input in the
development planning and review process.
CBAs, in their purest form, are private contracts between a
developer and a coalition of community interest groups.3 For
communities that have historically been excluded from the
planning process, CBAs can be a powerful tool to ensure that
neighborhood interests are addressed as an integral component
of development.4 By using CBAs, community coalitions can
make project sponsors respond to their needs and interests, and
they can bind developers to their promises through legally
enforceable contract terms. Perhaps more significantly, the
community is empowered to speak and make decisions for itself
on myriad issues, including negotiating for community amenities
that have traditionally been within the purview of the local
comprehensive planning regime. The result, ideally, is growth
3

See Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values,
and Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.
L. 35, 46 (2008).
4
See, e.g., Ryan Juskus & Elizabeth Elia, Long Time Coming, 150
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (2007), available at http://www.nhi.org/online/
issues/150/longtimecoming.html (“A neighborhood famous for its vitality
under the constraints of segregation, Shaw was neglected and abused for so
many ensuing decades . . . . One DC and Shaw resident claimed these
blighted lots as community assets and declared that even these properties, if
jealously guarded, could be a source of neighborhood power and wealth. This
is the revolutionary idea of community-benefits agreements: that the
community members—even those without money or power, who are usually
ignored in development plans or manipulated like chess pieces—can be an
asset and a force with which to contend.”).
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and development that is accountable to the people it affects and
equitable in its distribution of benefits and burdens. However,
the people it affects are often a small subset of the municipal
jurisdiction and the equitable distribution sought in the CBAs is
limited to the proposed project area.
The legal relationship between CBAs and planning is
unclear. Critics may perceive CBAs as circumventing
government planning processes in order to put insular
5
neighborhood concerns ahead of broader metropolitan interests.
Supporters, on the other hand, may view traditional planning
processes as inadequate and may see CBAs as a tool to advance
civic engagement.6 CBA coalitions have been accused of abusing
the tool when they fail to represent the full spectrum of
community stakeholders, but as yet no workable definition of the
“community” has been established.7
This article explores how the comprehensive planning
process and CBAs complement and contradict each other, and
how both could be improved by innovative and more inclusive
planning techniques. Part II provides a brief historical
background on comprehensive planning and community
development, including issues relating to community planning
and public participation. Part III examines CBAs and their role
in community empowerment, community development and the
promotion of social justice principles, including equitable
development. This part also provides examples of typical land
use related elements found in existing CBAs. Using these
examples, Part IV segues into a discussion regarding whether
private CBAs usurp the public planning process. The section
explores whether CBAs are just another type of communitybased plan and whether CBAs advance narrow interests at the
expense of the larger community. The question of what local
governments should do when presented with a CBA that is
inconsistent with the local comprehensive land use plan is
examined to determine whether amending the plan to incorporate
5
6
7

See infra Part IV.B.
Gross, supra note 3, at 38.
See infra Part III.A.1.
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the community vision as articulated through the CBA is
appropriate. The article concludes in Part V by pointing out that
shortcomings of the current regulatory system allow local
governments, intentionally or inadvertently, to exclude robust
public participation from the development and implementation of
comprehensive land use plans. This provides the impetus for
privately negotiated CBAs, but these agreements may not always
be ideal because not all parties to a CBA will have the best
interests of the neighborhood or the community as a whole at the
forefront of their agendas. While many CBAs have been
successful, a number of case studies also reveal pitfalls in the
process. The article concludes with the belief that local
governments must be more inclusive and accountable in the
public planning process to better meet the true goals of the
community benefits movement.
II. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
A. The Origins of Traditional Comprehensive Planning
The federal and state governments have long recognized the
role of municipalities in comprehensive planning for community
development.8 Planning, in this context, may be best described
as “an attempt to coordinate the development of all the
interrelated aspects of the physical environment, and all the
closely related aspects of the social and economic
environment.”9 At the First National Conference on City
Planning and the Problems of Congestion, which was convened
in Washington, D.C., in 1909, Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr.,
described city plans as “a compendium of all regulations on
building, physical development, ‘districting’ of land, health
ordinances, and ‘police rules’ for the use and development of

8

See generally SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 5:2, 5:11 (5th
ed. 2009) [hereinafter SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING].
9
NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW, VOL. 1 10 (Thomson West 2003).
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land.” Almost 20 years later, Alfred Bettman described the city
plan as:
. . . a master design for the physical development of the
territory of the city. It constitutes the division of land
between public and private uses, specifying the general
location and extent of new public improvements, grounds
and structures . . . and, in the case of private
developments, the general distribution [of land areas]
amongst various classes of uses, such as residential,
11
business and industrial uses.
Beginning with the Model Standard City Planning Enabling
Act in 1928 (“Standard Act”), local governments were vested
12
with authority to develop community-wide plans. The Act
provided for the establishment of a planning commission, which
would be vested with the responsibility “to make and adopt a
master plan for the physical development of the
municipality . . . including, among other things, the general
location, character, and extent of streets, viaducts, subways,
bridges, waterways, water fronts, boulevards, parkways,
playgrounds, squares, parks, aviation fields, and other public
ways . . . .”13 The Standard Act additionally included provisions
for the adoption of a master street plan, provisions for the
approval of all public improvements by the planning
commission, subdivision controls, and provisions for the
establishment of a regional planning commission and a regional
plan.14 Under the model set forth in the Standard Act, non10

JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 21 (West Group, 1998).
11
Id. at 22 (citing PLANNING PROBLEMS OF TOWN, CITY AND REGION:
PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE TWENTIETH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
CITY PLANNING, reprinted in W. GOODMAN & E. FREUND, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING, 352–53 (4th ed. 1968)).
12
U.S. Department of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling
Act (1928), available at http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CP
EnablingAct1928.pdf.
13
Id. at 13–15.
14
Id.; see also, Ruth Knack et al., The Real Story Behind the Standard
Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s, Feb. 1996, at 4–6, available at
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elected officials dominated the local planning function. It was
believed that their arguably non-partisan status made them better
suited than elected politicians to take a hard look at challenging
16
planning issues.
Most of the states adopted the Standard Act, and although
many of the states’ comprehensive planning statutes have been
modernized, the influence of the Standard Act continues to
17
resonate today. A process-oriented statute, one of the Standard
Act’s most significant influences was its preference for optional
rather than mandatory planning.18 While this led to the belief that
planning was not necessarily a prerequisite to the adoption of
zoning laws, Alfred Bettman explained that “[t]he zoning
ordinance is, of course, execution and the planning precedes
it . . . .”19
Today, a comprehensive land use plan20 commonly refers to
a written document that is formally adopted by a local legislative
body, which contains goals, objectives and strategies for the
future development and conservation of the community.21 It

http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/LULZDFeb96.pdf.
15
GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7–11.
16
Id.
17
See Rodney L. Cobb, Toward Modern Statutes: A Survey of State
Laws on Local Land-Use Planning, in MODERNIZING STATE PLANNING
STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING PAPERS 21 (1998).
18
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §3.05 (5th ed., LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2003).
19
Charles M. Harr, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 362 (1955) (quoting an unpublished note
written by Bettman).
20
Depending upon local definition, the terms “comprehensive land use
plan,” “master plan” and “general plan” may be used interchangeably.
21
However, while either legally or intuitively the comprehensive plan
should be a written document, this is not the case in all states. For example,
in New York, the enabling statutes suggest that a comprehensive plan be a
written document. N.Y. Town Law § 272–a. (2009). However, the statutes
also recognize the validity of prior caselaw that allowed the concept of the
comprehensive plan to be a reflection of an ongoing planning process rather
than “pay slavish servitude to any particular document.” Udell v. Haas, 235
N.E.2d 897, 902 (1968).
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should represent the “big picture” of what the community looks
22
like today and what it aspires to look like in the future, and the
policies identified in the plan should guide development
23
regulations and decisions made under them. By providing a
baseline for consistency regarding local governments’ land use
decisions, the comprehensive plan helps to safeguard against
24
arbitrary, irrational, biased and ad hoc actions.
Most states do not make the adoption of a comprehensive
plan a statutory pre-requisite to the adoption of zoning
regulations,25 but the notion that the plan precedes the regulation
is widely accepted as a best practice.26 Where there is a
comprehensive plan, the states also diverge on the question of
whether zoning must be consistent with it: some states give no
significance to the plan and do not require consistency; the
majority of states do not require consistency but do consider the
plan to be a factor in the evaluation of zoning regulations; and
the rest hold the plan to be controlling and require all land use
actions to be consistent with its goals and policies.27 Long a
22

See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-6.
JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: PRIMER FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS
AND CITIZENS 18 (1998); GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra
note 1, at 7-7.
24
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-7;
Daniel J. Curtin & Jonathan D. Witten, Windfalls, Wipeouts, Givings, and
Takings in Dramatic Redevelopment Projects: Bargaining for Better Zoning
on Density, Views, and Public Access, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325,
335 (2005) (discussing the importance of a comprehensive plan in preventing
manipulation of the planning process for private gain).
25
See Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement that Zoning and Land
Use Controls Be Consistent with an Independently Adopted Local
Comprehensive Plan: A Model Statute, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 305
(2000) [hereinafter Meck, A Model Statute]. A survey published by the
American Planning Association in 1998 revealed that ten states made local
planning optional, twenty-five states made it conditionally mandatory (i.e.,
local governments would only be required to develop a plan if they created a
planning commission); and fifteen states made local planning mandatory.
Cobb, supra note 17, at 21–23.
26
See SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 8 at § 5:1.
27
Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning
Law, 40 URB. LAW. 549, 549 (2008). The three approaches are referred to as
23
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minority position, the consistency approach has steadily been
gaining ground, with the result that “the comprehensive plan has
been invested with an increasing role in judging land use
regulations or actions so that . . . plans are required and, once
28
in place, are a significant, if not decisive, factor . . . .”
The general goals and policies enunciated in modern
comprehensive plans are typically organized into separate
elements covering such issues as land use, housing,
transportation, public facilities, open space, and economic
development.29 The American Planning Association’s Growing
Smart Legislative Guidebook, which was intended to provide a
modern update of the Standard Act,30 recommends that state
planning enabling statutes reflect a three tiered approach to local
comprehensive plan elements: the most important elements, such
as housing and transportation, should be mandatory; important
elements that may not be appropriate for smaller local
governments, or for other good reasons, should have an opt-out
alternative; and elements that are not essential, but which the
31
state considers appropriate planning topics, should be optional.
The states have taken varying approaches. For example,
Florida’s enabling statute is very detailed and includes
mandatory, opt-out and optional elements.32 In New York, by
the “unitary view” (plans not required and given no effect), the “planning
factor view” (plans are a factor in judging land use regulations), and the
“planning mandate view” (plans required and zoning must be consistent with
them). Id.; see also Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 331–37 (2005)
(discussing different state approaches to comprehensive planning).
28
Sullivan, supra note 27, at 549.
29
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-61
to 7-66.
30
Recognizing that “[t]he planning approaches of the 1920s are incapable
of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century[,]” the American
Planning Association decided to develop a new set of model guidelines. The
product culminated in the Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook, which
contains model planning statutes and commentary to help explain their
purposes and applications. GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra
note 1, at xxix–xxx.
31
Id. at 7-62.
32
FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2009).
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contrast, the state has chosen to provide statutory guidance as to
the appropriate elements to be addressed in the comprehensive
plan, but the listing of elements is completely optional.33 Other
states fall somewhere in the middle. Arizona specifies both
mandatory and optional elements, which may vary depending on
34
the city’s size, and while Idaho’s statute is limited to
mandatory elements, it allows local governments to opt out if
they can explain why they should not have to address a
35
particular element. The elements specified in Maryland’s
planning legislation are almost all mandatory, with only one
optional topic,36 whereas New Hampshire requires only two
sections but provides a list of more than a dozen optional
elements.37
An important characteristic of the comprehensive planning
framework is that plans remain flexible and open to change,
allowing the creation of new planning goals and new strategies
to achieve existing ones. The Growing Smart Guidebook,
recognizing that plans must be continually reassessed in light of
changing physical assets and new social paradigms, recommends
that local governments review and revise their plans at least
once every five years.38 The statutory content of comprehensive
plans has similarly expanded over the years. Contemporary
elements have focused on such issues as affordable housing,39
alternative
transportation,40
mixed-use
development,41

33

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272–a (2003).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9–461.05 (2009).
35
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67–6508 (2007).
36
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1.04 (2009).
37
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2 (2008).
38
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-230
to 7-233.
39
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(c)(1)(B)(4) (Deering 2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(e)(2) (West 2009).
40
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 9–461.05(E)(9); FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177(3)(a)(6) (amended 2008); MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B,
§ 3.05(a)(4)(iii)(2) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(q) (2009);
OR. ADMIN. R. 660-012-0020(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-510(D)(8)
(amended 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(a)(vii) (2005); WIS.
34
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43

environmental protection, disaster management, and water
44
resources. Community awareness regarding the impacts of
human development on climate change has recently prompted
some states to amend their planning statutes to include
45
alternative energy and sustainability goals. Local governments,
even where not required, have frequently adopted similar
46
elements in their general plans.

STAT. § 66.1001(2)(c) (2009).
41
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11–821(C)(1)(b) (amended 2008);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-23(c), (d)(1) (2009); FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177(6)(a) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(f) (2009).
42
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11–821(D)(2), 9–461.05(E)(1)
(amended 2008); CAL. GOV. CODE § 65302(d); N.H. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 674:2(III)(d) (2009); MD. CODE ANN. art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(4)(ix) (amended
2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81D(5) (amended 1998); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(d). (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(b)
(2009); 53 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 10301(a)(6) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6–
29–510(D)(4) (amended 2005); WIS. STAT. § 66.1001(2)(e) (2009).
43
See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 65302(g)(2009); FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177(7)(h) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(e) (2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.160(1)(l).
44
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 9–461.05(D)(5), 11–821(C)(3)
(amended 2008); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 30–28–106 sec. (3) (IV) (amended
2009); FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(c)(2009); MD. CODE ANN. Art. 66B,
§ 3.05(a)(4)(vi) (amended 2009); 53 PENN. STAT. ANN. § 10301(b) (2000).
45
In 2008, for example, Florida amended its planning enabling act to
require local plans to consider methods to discourage urban sprawl, support
energy-efficient development patterns, and reduce greenhouse gases. See Act
of July 1, 2008, 2008 Fla. Laws ch. 191 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177). Arizona also requires planning for energy efficiency and
renewable energy development. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 11-821 (C)(4), 9461.05 (E) (10); see also N.J. STAT. § 40:55D-28 (b)(16) (West 2009);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-106 (3)(a)(VI), 31-23-206 (1)(f); 53 PENN.
STAT. ANN. § 10301.1 (2009).
46
Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening
State and Local Land Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change
Challenges and Preserve Resources for Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121 (2009).
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B. Community-Based Planning
Despite a lack of guidance from most state comprehensive
47
planning statutes, “[t]here has long been a move away from
centralized planning in the urban context toward more
48
community-based planning.” Strongly influenced by the racial
and socioeconomic discrimination endemic in the implementation
of urban renewal plans, and the Civil Rights movement of the
1960s, Paul Davidoff articulated a theory of “advocacy
planning” in 1965 that remains applicable today:
The recommendation that city planners represent and
plead the plans of many interest groups is founded upon
the need to establish an effective urban democracy, one
in which citizens may be able to play an active role in
the process of deciding public policy. Appropriate policy
in a democracy is determined through a process of
political debate. The right course of action is always a
matter of choice, never of fact. In a bureaucratic age
great care must be taken that choices remain in the area
49
of public view and participation.
The ideals of inclusiveness, democracy and public
participation remain fundamental to community-based planning,
47

Very few state planning enabling acts specifically provide for the
creation of small-scale comprehensive plans. Exceptions include Montana,
New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-1601(4) (2009) (requiring neighborhood plans to be consistent with the
municipality’s growth policy); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:2(III)(j)
(requiring a master plan to be adopted before any neighborhood plan, and
requiring that plan to be consistent with the master plan); D.C. Code § 1306.03 (2009).
48
Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and
Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 578; see also James
Jennings, Race, Politics, and Community Development in U.S. Cities: Urban
Planning, Community Participation, and the Roxbury Master Plan in Boston,
594 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13–14 (2004) (discussing the
origins of the community-based planning movement).
49
Paul Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 34(4) J. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 331 (1965), reprinted in READINGS IN PLANNING THEORY
211–12 (Scott Campbell & Susan S. Fainstein, eds., 2d ed. 2003).
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and they have become core principles of the community benefits
50
movement as well.
Community-based planning recognizes that metropolitan
plans may not be adequate to meet the needs of individual
neighborhoods, as “[p]eople who are close to neighborhood
issues can clearly identify community needs and advocate
51
passionately for local concerns.” This type of planning is also
premised on a belief that a city’s general plan will be made
stronger by encompassing separately developed neighborhood
plans.52 In other words, it is community-driven, rather than “top
down.”53 This type of paradigm shift also requires a reappraisal
of the role that professional planners play in the land use
process. Gone are the “ostensibly omniscient” non-partisan

50

Gross, supra note 3, at 37–39.
Department of City Planning, Community Based Planning,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/community_planning/index.shtml
(providing an overview of the city’s 197-a community planning process) (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009).
52
Seattle’s neighborhood planning process has been thoroughly evaluated
and it was found to be a success. The program received a 93% approval
rating in a citizen survey, and the city found that it had positive impacts on
the coordination of public entities, provided valuable education to citizens
concerning the land use process, encouraged community-building, facilitated
ongoing citizen participation, and minimized public opposition and legal
challenges. The full report identified problems with the process and made
suggestions for improvements. Seattle Office of City Auditor, Revisit
Neighborhood Plan Implementation. http://seattle.gov/audit/docs/Published
NPI.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
53
See New York City Community-Based Planning Task Force, Planning
for All New Yorkers, http://www.mas.org/planningcenter/atlas/pdf/
PlanningForAllNewYorkers_PlatformForAllNewYorkers.pdf.
The
Community-Based Planning Task Force, which is staffed by the Municipal
Art Society, “is a coalition of grassroots organizations, citywide civic groups,
community boards, elected officials, professional planners, and academics.
They were motivated to act after seeing that, in some cases, plans devised by
the city did not address neighborhood needs, while, at the same time, there is
no effective mechanism to implement the creative, proactive plans that
communities developed for their neighborhoods.” The Campaign for
Community-Based Planning: Task Force, http://communitybasedplanning.
wordpress.com/task-force/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
51
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planners that implemented the Standard Acts; modern city
planners, in addition to developing regulatory standards and
synthesizing comprehensive planning goals, should act “as
facilitators, community organizers, and gatherers and
54
distributors of information . . . .”
Because of the smaller scale of community-based plans, there
are often more opportunities for citizen engagement, whether
through formal public hearings, or through more informal
55
planning workshops and charettes. The New York City 197-a
planning process, for example, requires a number of public
hearings and approval by the planning commission and city
council before a community plan can be adopted.56 With the help
of proactive community boards and civic organizations such as
the Municipal Art Society, many plans have been shaped
through community outreach efforts and collaborative planning
sessions.57 Other cities, such as Minneapolis, offer funding and
54

Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 292
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho II].
55
Many cities have developed community-based planning frameworks,
whether referred to as neighborhood plans, specific plans, small area plans,
or community-based plans. See, e.g., San Jose Department of Planning,
Building & Code Enforcement, Specific Plans, Overview, http://www.san
joseca.gov/planning/spec_plan/default.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); City of
Columbus, Guide to Area and Neighborhood Planning, http://assets.
columbus.gov/development/planning/PlanningGuide.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2009); Minneapolis Community Planning & Economic Development,
Neighborhood Guide for Developing Planning Documents, http://www.ci.
minneapolis.mn.us/cped/docs/NeighborhoodGuideforDevelopingPlanning.pdf
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009); Baltimore Neighborhood Planning Program,
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/neighborhoods/npp/index.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
56
New York City Charter § 197-a (2008).
57
See, e.g., The Municipal Art Society, A Vision for Midtown’s East
River Waterfront is Unveiled, Jun. 11, 2007, https://s12544.gridserver.
com/viewarticle.php?id=1731&category=46 (describing the results of a
charette intended to define goals for the development of the East River
waterfront); GREENPOINT 197-A COMMITTEE, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN 6
(1998), available at http://www.gwapp.org/GWAPP/01-Introduction.PDF
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technical assistance for qualified community organizations that
58
wish to build public participation and develop small area plans.
Innovative methods to involve people from all sectors of the
community are also being developed. The San Francisco
Planning Department organizes walking and bus tours to
encourage discussions about how residents want their
59
neighborhoods to develop, and San Jose has used an online
planning wiki to reach people who cannot attend (or do not want
60
to attend) planning meetings in person.
Community-based, small scale planning has moved a long
way from the rigid and disconnected framework set up by the
Standard Act, but it shares with more conventional planning
models the basic idea that communities benefit from long range
planning based on common goals and visions. The
comprehensive plan, in the context of community-based
frameworks, is a more dynamic tool, however. As law professor
Alejandro Esteban Camacho explains:
The collaborative model recognizes that modern land use
planning and development are not static enterprises, but
rather a continuing process that must be flexible in order
to maximize effectiveness. Adaptable planning and
permitting, which are natural extensions of a problem
solving orientation, draw on a pragmatic notion of
decision-making as an ongoing, iterative process of

(“Through public forums, workshops, discussions, petitions, and local
newspapers, collaboration between community-based groups, merchants,
residents, manufacturers, new and old immigrants, and the young and the old
began to revitalize the community by means of this local planning process.”).
58
See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, COMMUNITY PLANNING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES
(2006), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cped/docs/citizen_
participation_guidelines.pdf.
59
San Francisco Planning Department, Better Neighborhoods, The
Planning Process, http://www.sfgov.org/site/planning_index.asp?id=25172
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
60
Press Release, City of San Jose, San Jose Harnesses Web 2.0
Technology to Help Determine City’s Future and Growth (July 31, 2009),
available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/pdf/WikiplanningReleaseFINAL.pdf.
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design, implementation, and evaluation. Adaptability
applies not just to plans and agreements but also to the
regulatory process itself; as the process matures, it is
evaluated and adjusted to incorporate information such as
the value of different forms of participation in facilitating
informed decision-making, community cooperation, and
61
valuable land use.
Another significant difference between traditional and
community-based comprehensive planning relates to the timing
and duration of community engagement. Most state enabling
statutes indicate that it is sufficient to hold one public hearing
during the development of a comprehensive plan, and one
hearing during the legislative process for its adoption.62 Some
states, however, have specifically provided for increased public
participation in the preparation and adoption of local plans.63 The
American Planning Association’s Growing Smart Legislative
Guidebook adopts this approach:
The processes for engaging the public in planning are not
made clear in many planning statutes. Requirements for
public notice, public hearings, workshops, and
distribution and publication of plans and development
regulations are often improvised. Consequently, the
public may find its role and the use of its input uncertain,
and it may be suspicious of plans and decisions that
emerge. Planning should be doing the opposite; it should
be engaging citizens positively at all steps in the planning
process, acknowledging and responding to their
comments and concerns. Through collaborative
61

Camacho II, supra note 54, at 295.
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (2009).
63
See PATRICIA E SALKIN, COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES FOR PREPARING
AND ADOPTING A LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, in MODERNIZING STATE
PLANNING STATUTES: THE GROWING SMART WORKING PAPERS, vol. 2
(American Planning Association 1998) (noting a number of statutory
approaches to achieving a more collaborative and inclusive planning process,
including a requirement in the State of Washington for cities and counties that
plan under the Growth Management Act to establish and disseminate a public
participation program, see R.C.W. sec. 36.70A.140).
62

SALKIN REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 11:32 PM

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

173

approaches, planning should build support for outcomes
that ensure that what the public wants indeed will
happen.64
Community-based planning, moreover, recognizes that there
is a continuing need for public participation throughout the
plan’s implementation. This is especially true given the
increasing popularity of development agreements, planned unit
developments (PUDs), special overlay districts, and similar
long-term land use controls. Unlike zoning ordinances, which
are intended to be applied uniformly, the express purpose of
these controls is to make the planning process more flexible and
more easily tailored to specific properties. However, while
“these negotiated processes provide[] the applicant-developer
with substantial opportunities to participate in the decision
process, public input . . . has not advanced beyond a traditional
command and control model that only provides access to the
process at the local agency’s final approval of the agreement.”65
To the extent that these regulatory techniques affect a
community’s long-term goals, as embodied in the adaptive
comprehensive plan, the community arguably should have a
more significant role in the decision making process.66
C. Environmental Justice
One of the hallmarks of the environmental justice
67
movement is “meaningful involvement,” which requires that:
(1) people have an opportunity to participate in decisions
about activities that may affect their environment and/or
64

GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at xlvii.
Camacho I, supra note 1, at 17.
66
See Camacho II, supra note 54, at 297–99.
67
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental
justice as “[t]he fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.” United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ej.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
65
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health; (2) the public’s contribution can influence the
regulatory agency’s decision; (3) their concerns will be
considered in the decision making process; and (4) the
decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of
68
those potentially affected.
While the comprehensive planning framework allows more
opportunities for public participation than does an ad hoc zoning
process,69 and community-based planning can encourage even
70
more public involvement, communities are still overlooked —
especially those “discrete and insular minorities” that may be
more in need of protection than other groups.71
In additional to meaningful involvement, the environmental
justice movement seeks to ensure fair treatment, meaning “that
no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial,
governmental and commercial operations or policies.”72 Fair
treatment also requires an equitable distribution of environmental
goods, such as parks, open spaces, and cultural and historical
resources. Too often, the low income and minority communities
that are excluded from the planning process are the same
communities that are burdened by negative environmental
impacts and provided with few environmental benefits. One
model approach proposes to address this reality by
68

Id.
Wideman, supra note 2, at 191–92 (“[Comprehensive] plans,
especially when they result from an inclusive process, do more to foster
public participation and simultaneously decrease the potential for corruption
because of the diversity of opinions shaping the decisions. Some argue that ad
hoc zoning, in contrast, is vulnerable to domination by factions.”).
70
See, e.g., id. at 135, 144 (“Indeed, the [New York City Planning]
Commission’s processes seem designed to discourage public participation—
public hearings take place at ten o’clock on Wednesday mornings, making the
hearings inaccessible to those with daytime obligations such as work or
family, and calendar notices and subscriptions are available at a large fee.”).
71
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938).
72
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Basic Information,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2009).
69
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recommending the appointment of a public participation
coordinator to work with various communities and stakeholders
to invite and encourage broader participation.73
It has been noted that, “the next frontier for both the
[environmental justice] movement and the focus of
74
environmental justice scholarship . . . is land use planning.”
California has been a pioneer in incorporating environmental
75
justice concerns into the local land use planning process.
Ensuring meaningful participation by all cross-sections of the
community is important to give credibility and respect to the
process. “Providing for active involvement by people-of-color
and low-income residents in developing the goals of a locality’s
comprehensive plan, at least as it relates to their own
neighborhoods, will help to ensure that local zoning laws or
ordinances are developed and/or amended to reflect the desires
of these communities.”76 As professor Craig Anthony “Tony”
Arnold argues, “land use planning and regulation foster choice,
self-determination, and self-definition for local neighborhoods,
not paternalism that insists that there is a single correct
environmental justice goal.”77
In 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit was held. The conference delegates drafted
seventeen principles that better define environmental justice, and
these principles have served as a pioneering document for the

73

SALKIN, supra note 63, at 151.
Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and
Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
75
See Chapter 762 of the California Laws of 2001, which required the
Governor’s Office of Planning and Research to publish guidelines for the
incorporation of environmental justice issues in the general plans of
municipalities.
76
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ADDRESSING
COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND
USE PLANNING & ZONING 44 (2003), available at http://www.napawash.org/
Pubs/EJ.pdf.
77
Craig Anthony Arnold, Land Use Regulation and Environmental
Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10427 (June 2000).
74
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78

rapidly expanding movement. A number of these principles are
directly applicable to community development. For example,
Principle Five states: “[e]nvironmental [j]ustice affirms the
fundamental right to political, economic, cultural, and
79
environmental self-determination of all peoples.” This principle
is related to both community planning and CBAs because both
processes emphasize community-driven planning and often
include the desire and promise to improve local economic and
environmental
situations.
Principle
Twelve
states:
“[e]nvironmental [j]ustice affirms the need for urban and rural
ecological policies to clean up and rebuild our cities and rural
areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of
all our communities, and provide[s] fair access for all to the full
range of resources.”80 This is both an example of an aspirational
goal appropriate for inclusion in local comprehensive plans, and
in the CBA process, project applicants often offer environmental
benefits such as park and open space and green building designs.
The equitable development movement, which is closely
related to the environmental justice movement, is grounded in
four principles: integrating people strategies and place strategies;
reducing local and regional disparities; promoting “double
bottom line” investments that produce fair returns for investors
as well as benefits for the community, and ensuring meaningful
community participation, leadership and ownership.81 As
discussed more fully below, CBAs are noted as one effective
strategy to achieving equitable development.82

78

PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF
COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, Apr. 6, 1996, http://www.
ejnet.org/ej/principles.html.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Angela Glover Blackwell, Equitable Development, in BUILDING
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (Roger A.
Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, eds., 2009).
82
Id.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENTS MOVEMENT
The CBA movement originated in California in the late
1990s as a way to make large-scale development projects more
83
accountable to the neighborhoods that they impact. The basic
model is simple: community groups form a coalition and use its
capacity for building public support to persuade the project
developer to provide amenities and mitigations desired by local
residents, business owners, and employees. After negotiations,
agreements between the coalition and the developer are
memorialized in a legally enforceable bilateral contract.84 In
states where local governments are authorized to enter into
development agreements, CBAs are often incorporated into these
documents so that municipal authorities, in addition to
community representatives, have the power to enforce the
developer’s promises.85
A. The Overlap of CBAs and Comprehensive Plans
From the outset, CBA coalitions have aspired to achieve
environmental and social justice goals for the communities they
represent, seeking to bind developers to commitments for living
wages, local hiring policies, and increased environmental
86
standards, among other things. Like community-based planning
83

Patricia Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations
for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 301–306 (discussing the Hollywood and Highland
CBA).
84
Id. at 293–94.
85
Id. at 295. Development agreements are authorized in about a dozen
states. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land
Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution:
Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 663, 671 n.32 (2001).
86
See generally Julian Gross et al., Community Benefits Agreements:
Making Development Projects Accountable, GOOD JOBS FIRST & THE
CALIFORNIA PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES (2005), available at
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programs, they have drawn attention to the fact that the planning
and development review process often fails to address the needs
of historically disempowered low income, minority, and non87
English speaking communities.
While supporters of
community-based planning have sought to change the planning
and development review process to make it more inclusive and
accessible, the CBA contract model allows community coalitions
to bypass the traditional planning process entirely.
Many of the commitments contained in CBAs relate
primarily to labor standards and corporate operations (e.g.,
wage and hiring provisions), but other CBA promises involve
the same concerns that have historically been addressed through
the planning and zoning process. Provisions relating to land use,
housing, transportation, environmental standards, and small
business development have all become common in CBAs. In
many cases, and particularly in California and other states that
recognize development agreements, this has led to positive
results, with community, government and private sector
representatives working together in a sort of extra-publicprivate-partnership. Yet, in other cases, CBA coalitions have
failed to gain the support of a broad enough cross section of
community interests to be considered legitimate. This has been
especially problematic in New York, where local governments
are not formally authorized to engage in development
negotiations.88 CBAs negotiated under such circumstances are
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/cba2005final.pdf.
87
Gross, supra note 3, at 37–38 (2008) (“Community-based
organizations often assert that low-income neighborhoods, non-Englishspeaking areas, and communities of color have little voice in the development
process. Laws concerning public notice and participation are sometimes
poorly enforced, and official public hearings are often held during the
workday.”).
88
In New York, any zoning changes offered by a city in exchange for
development amenities must be undertaken according to a general incentive
zoning ordinance applying to all property developments. N.Y. GEN. CITY
§ 81–d (2003). However, development often occurs not with the assistance of
local governments, but under the aegis of either a state or local economic
development authority. These quasi-public agencies have broad authority to
condition various types of subsidies, including zoning overrides, on certain
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often depicted as “developer-driven,” and they may interfere
with the planning process rather than improving it.
The following subsections describe how various CBAs have
incorporated community development issues usually reserved as
part of the comprehensive or neighborhood planning process.
For purposes of this section, several agreements that are only
89
arguably “CBAs” will be discussed. These, problematic
“CBAs,” which have not encouraged inclusiveness, transparency
and accountability in the development review process, are
discussed in the next Part.90
1. Meaningful Public Participation and
Equitable Development
The community benefits movement, like community-based
planning and environmental justice, has made meaningful
community involvement in the development process a priority
goal. The act of forming a coalition and demanding that
developers be accountable to the neighborhoods that they impact
is in itself a form of public participation, and the agreements
obtained through CBA negotiations often include provisions to
ensure that coalition groups will continue to be heard in the
future.
Under most CBAs, the developer must maintain continued
contact with the coalition and keep it apprised of the project’s
status. An advisory committee is often set up, including
development conditions, and to memorialize such agreements in bilateral
contracts. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. § 858 (powers of industrial development
agencies); N.Y. UNCONSOL. Ch. 252 § 5 (powers of the Empire State
Development Corporation).
89
CBA advocates have attempted to define the CBA concept as “a
legally binding contract (or set of related contracts), setting forth a range of
community benefits regarding a development project, and resulting from
substantial community involvement.” Gross, supra note 3, at 37. This
definition excludes all of the New York CBAs.
90
The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market and Columbia
University CBAs have been criticized for their lack of community
involvement and it has been forcefully argued that they are not, in fact,
community benefits agreements. See id. at 41–44.
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developer and coalition representatives, and this committee may
make recommendations on project plans or implementation
measures.91 This type of framework gives community
representatives a formal role in the project’s development, but a
few CBAs have gone a step farther by giving coalitions a larger
role in the general planning process. The coalition that
negotiated the Ballpark Village CBA, for example, secured
$100,000 from the developer for a professionally prepared
economic impact study. The study was directed to address “the
effects of new construction and rising land values in downtown
San Diego on the Neighboring Communities and [to] recommend
specific policy measures to encourage investment as well as
protect long-term, Low-Income Local Residents from
displacement.”92 In Pittsburgh, a CBA concerning the new
Penguins Arena included funding for the creation of a
neighborhood master plan, which will cover issues relating to
land use, community services, parks and open space, housing,
social and environmental impacts, urban design, education,
91

The Staples Center CBA, for example, established an Advisory
Committee to provide input to the developer about the construction
management plan, the traffic management plan, the waste management plan,
the neighborhood traffic protection plan, and other environmental concerns
(e.g. pedestrian safety, air quality, green building). Staples Center,
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at sec. XI, A-13 (2001), available at
http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/Los%20Angeles%20Sports%2
0and%20Entertainment%20District%20Project.pdf [hereinafter Staples CBA];
see also Dearborn Street Implementation Committee, EXECUTED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, at art. 5, http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id=
1464 [hereinafter Dearborn Street CBA]; Hunters Point Implementation
Committee, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 14 (2008), http://www.
communitybenefits.org/downloads/Bayview%20Hunters%20Point%20CBA.pd
f [hereinafter Hunters Point CBA]; Pacoima Community Oversight
Committee, PLAZA PACOIMA PROJECT COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at
sec. X [hereinafter Pacoima Plaza CBA]; Park East Community Advisory
Committee, PARK EAST REDEVELOPMENT COMPACT, http://www.community
benefits.org/downloads/PERC.pdf [hereinafter Park East Redevelopment
Compact].
92
Ballpark Village Project, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 12
(2005), available at http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/Ballpark%
20Village%20CBA.pdf [hereinafter Ballpark Village CBA].
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economic development, traffic, arts and culture, historic
preservation and uses for vacant property. The Penguins,
moreover, agreed to postpone the submission of further
93
development proposals until after the plan’s completion.
The site-specific nature of CBAs also offers an effective way
to impose mitigation requirements on developers in order to
ensure a more equitable distribution of negative environmental
94
impacts. Many CBAs, for example, include provisions to limit
construction impacts such as diesel exhaust, particulate
emissions and dust.95 The CBA covering the LAX airport
93

One Hill Neighborhood Coalition & Sports and Exhibition Authority
of Pittsburg, HILL DISTRICT COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 5–6
(2008), http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id=1463 [hereinafter
Penguins CBA]. To be specific, the Penguins only agreed to postpone further
development proposals until February 2010.
94
See Larissa Larsen, The Pursuit of Responsible Development:
Addressing Anticipated Benefits and Unwanted Burdens through Community
Benefits Agreements 6 (Ctr. For Local State, and Urban Policy Working
Paper Series, No. 9, 2009) (stating that “spatial inequity is central to the
environmental justice movement” and “relevant to the site-specific nature of
CBAs”) (citing DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF
DIFFERENCE (Blackwell Publishing 1996)).
95
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 35,
http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/pr/cba.pdf [hereinafter Atlantic Yards CBA]
(requiring a plan for minimizing truck idling); Ballpark Village CBA, supra
note 92, at 6, 17, 22, 24–25, 28, 30 (requiring contaminated soils will not be
shipped to treatment facilities in urban neighborhoods or that have adverse
compliance histories, restrictions in pesticide use in landscaping, prohibition
on onsite incineration, minimized idling, and designated construction routes);
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (requiring trucks to minimize idling, and
requiring the developer to give preference to contractors that use low
emission equipment); LAX Master Plan Program, COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENT, at 17, 20, 22, 28, 29, available at http://www.laxmasterplan.
org/commBenefits/pdf/LAX_CBA_Final.pdf
[hereinafter
LAX
CBA]
(requiring electrified cargo gates to reduce emissions, $500,000 to replace
high emission equipment, requirement to phasing out airport vehicles and
replacing them with low emission or alternative vehicles, no idling, that for
diesel equipment best available emissions control devices be used for diesel
equipment as well as ultra low sulfur fuel, that rock crushing will be located
away from the communities neighboring LAX in order to reduce dust,
designated construction routes); Columbia University, COMMUNITY BENEFITS
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expansion also included special protections for communities
located next to the airport, which had long suffered from the
airport’s noise and pollution. The airport authority agreed to
fund an air quality study and a health impact study, the latter
focusing on upper respiratory diseases and hearing loss.
Nighttime departures were also restricted to limit noise, and
more than $4 million was allotted for soundproofing nearby
96
homes and schools. Since the LAX CBA was completed in
2004, air quality monitoring requirements have been included in
several other agreements.97
For industrial projects that create extensive negative
environmental impacts, Good Neighbor Agreements (“GNAs”)
can also be used to mandate protections for nearby
communities.98 GNAs use the same community-corporation
contract framework as CBAs, but they typically focus on the
complex technical mitigation solutions required by heavy
industrial facilities such as oil refineries, mines, chemical plants,
foundries, and large-scale agricultural operations. Most GNAs
require information about plant operations to be made available
AGREEMENT 34, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/gca/pdf-files/CBAAgreement
.pdf [hereinafter Columbia CBA] (ultra low sulfur fuels); Purina Site
Development, Community Benefits Agreement, http://amy.m.lavine.
googlepages.com/FINALPDFLongfellowCBA-Feb.242008.pdf
[hereinafter
Longfellow CBA]; COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT: CONCERNING THE
CHRISTINA AVENUE COMPOSTING FACILITY BY AND BETWEEN PENINSULA
COMPOST CO., LLC AND THE S. WILMINGTON COALITION 9–10 (2007)
[hereinafter Peninsula Compost CBA] (prohibiting truck traffic in adjacent
residential communities and requiring that trucks must be covered).
96
LAX CBA, supra note 95, at 6.
97
In the Gateway Center CBA, for instance, the developer agreed to
work with the New York City Department of Environmental Protection to
test for particulate emissions. Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market,
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT 33 [hereinafter Gateway Center CBA],
available at http://www.bronxgateway.com/documents/copy_of_community_
benefits_agreement/Signed_CBA_2_1_06.pdf; see also Ballpark Village CBA,
supra note 92.
98
See generally CPN, Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool For
Environmental and Social Justice, http://www.cpn.org/topics/environment/
goodneighbor.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (explaining the purpose,
benefits, and general scope of good neighbor agreements).
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to the public, and they often require facilities to be open to
inspection by designated community members or third parties.
Other provisions directly restrict corporate signatories. They
may be required to formulate accident prevention and
preparedness plans, covering such contingencies as chemical
spills and fires, and they may have to implement various
pollution prevention strategies. Although some GNAs have
included provisions relating to local hiring, union neutrality, and
99
funding for health centers and parks, they do not usually
address the variety of issues covered by most CBAs.100 Another
difference is that some GNAs are voluntary agreements that seek
primarily to build relationships and create dialogues about
pollution reduction and community health,101 whereas the CBA
movement makes enforceability a paramount concern.102
The close connection between CBAs, GNAs, and
environmental justice is evident in Connecticut’s 2008 law
103
regarding environmental justice communities —the only general
99

The Unocal GNA included funding for health studies and for a clinic,
a commitment to improve the site’s landscaping and construct a bike path,
funding for vocational training at the local high school, a hiring preference
for local employees, $4.5 million for transportation infrastructure
improvements, and $300,000 annually for 15 years to go into a community
fund. Good Neighbor Agreement: Unocal (on file with author). A promise to
donate certain conservation easements was included in the Stillwater Mine
GNA, as well as a promise that any land acquired by the company after the
GNA was signed would be encumbered with a conservation easement
restricting residential subdivisions. The GNA also limited permissible
locations for mine-sponsored housing. Good Neighbor Agreement: Stillwater
Mining Company, http://www.northernplains.org/files/2005amendedgna (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009).
100
See Gross, supra note 3, at 40, n.22.
101
See, e.g., The Southeast Como Improvement Association: Ritrama
Agreement, http://secomo.org/drupal/index.php?q=ritrama-agreement (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009); The Southeast Como Improvement Association: Rock
Tenn.
Agreement,
http://secomo.org/drupal/index.php?q=rock-tennagreement (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
102
Gross, supra note 3, at 39 (2007–2008) (“[L]egal enforceability
should be a prerequisite for something to be termed a CBA.”).
103
Conn. P.A. 08-94, S. 1, (codified as CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a
(2008)).
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state or local law yet to be enacted that attempts to regulate
104
CBA-like agreements.
The statute defines a “community
environmental benefit agreement” (“CEBA”) as:
[A] written agreement entered into by a municipality and
an owner or developer of real property whereby the
owner or developer agrees to develop real property that
is to be used for any new or expanded affecting facility
and to provide financial resources for the purpose of the
mitigation, in whole or in part, of impacts reasonably
related to the facility, including, but not limited to,
impacts on the environment, traffic, parking and noise.105
Unlike CBAs, these CEBAs are only implicated in the
construction of “affecting facilities,” which are defined as heavy
industrial facilities that are major pollution generators.106 While a
local government can enter into a CEBA regarding any affecting
facility, the law’s requirements apply only when an affecting
facility is being located in an “environmental justice
community,”107 defined as a census tract designated as distressed
under state law or with at least 30% of residents at or below
200% of the poverty line.108 When the law does apply, the
developer must consult with the local government regarding the
need for a CEBA,109 which may include provisions for on and
off site mitigations and “[f]unding for activities such as
environmental education, diesel pollution reduction, construction

104

In Milwaukee and Atlanta, local laws have been passed requiring
community benefits to be included in certain developments. While the
Connecticut legislation is a general law, applying throughout the state, both
the Milwaukee and Atlanta CBA are limited to specific sites within their
jurisdictions. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 83, at 319; Amy Lavine,
Atlanta Beltline Community Benefits, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
BLOG, May 19, 2008 (updated Aug. 16, 2009), http://communitybenefits.
blogspot.com/2008/05/atlanta-beltline-community-benefits.html.
105
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(4) (2008).
106
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(2) (2008) (defining “affecting
facility”).
107
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1) (2008).
108
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(a)(1).
109
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1).
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of biking and walking trails, staffing for parks, urban forestry,
support for community gardens or any other negotiated benefit
to the environment in the environmental justice community.”110
The developer is also required to file a “meaningful public
111
participation plan,” which should cover issues relating to
“appropriate opportunities” for public participation, methods for
seeking out and facilitating public input, and assurances that
public comments will be considered as part of the agency’s
112
decision.
2. Sustainable Development and
Pedestrian/Transit Oriented Design
As the public’s awareness of sustainability issues has grown
in recent years, planners have increasingly begun to incorporate
into community plans provisions encouraging green building,
energy and water efficiency, alternative transportation and
alternative energy.113 CBAs, too, have attempted to address
many of these issues.
The most common sustainability features found in CBAs
relate to green building standards. Typically, they require the
developer to meet the eligibility requirements for LEED
114
certification. Some require actual certification, usually at the
Silver level or lower, while others require only that the project
115
be eligible for LEED certification. Specific green building

110

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(c).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–20a(b)(1) (2008).
112
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a(a)(3) (2008) (defining “meaningful
public participation”).
113
Salkin, supra note 46.
114
U.S. Green Building Council, LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/Display
Page.aspx?CategoryID=19 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
115
See, e.g., Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (requiring LEED
silver); Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 17 (requiring LEED certification);
LAX CBA, supra note 95, at 29 (requiring LEED to the extent practicable);
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 8 (requiring LEED or Minnesota
standards); Gateway CBA, supra note 97, at 31 (requiring LEED Silver
goal); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 32 (requiring minimum LEED
111
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features may also be set forth in the CBA, whether part of the
LEED system or not. The Ballpark Village CBA, for example,
requires that windows must use bird-reflective glass,116 and the
Columbia University CBA specifies that the university will
“evaluate the use of green roof technology and managed
117
vegetated areas” as a way to control storm water runoff.
The Minneapolis Longfellow Station CBA stands out as an
example of sustainability planning in CBAs because of its
emphasis on transit oriented design (TOD) and amenities for
pedestrians and bicyclists. Similar to the broad goals and
principles that are typically included in comprehensive plans, the
CBA recites a list of guiding TOD principles,118 as well as more
specific project requirements. In order to promote alternative
transportation and advance the project’s TOD goals, the
developer agreed in the CBA to provide free one-month transit
passes to residential tenants and to ensure that transit fare can be
119
purchased onsite. The development must also include bicycle
storage and parking facilities, and dedicated parking spaces for
120
Zipcars.
To discourage automobile use, the CBA limits
parking to a maximum of one space per residential unit and 4.5
spaces for every 1,000 square feet of commercial space, and it
requires parking spaces to be leased separately from residential
units.121 Walkability and “placemaking” principles are also
included in the Longfellow Station CBA to promote human scale

silver); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 5 (requiring LEED certified
minimum, developer must try for better); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note
95, at 35 (requiring “prudent environmentally sound building practices”).
116
Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 7. It also requires pest
management, including using naturally pest-repellent vegetation and less toxic
pesticides. Id. at 31.
117
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 34.
118
Longfelllow CBA, supra note 95, at 5–6. The guiding principles
include: urban intensity; height, density, and public/green space; economic
vitality; urban form; urban uses; retail location; reverse the normal parking
rules; walkability; transit connectivity; and neighborhood connectivity.
119
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 14.
120
Id. at 14–15
121
Id. at 14–15
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123

design. Pedestrians are favored by requirements for paths,
124
125
wayfinding signs, landscaped public gathering spaces, and
safety measures such as traffic calming infrastructure.126
Sustainability principles also play a significant role in the
Columbia University CBA, which states that:
In decisions regarding the Project Area, [the university] shall
be guided by the following goals: protecting the biosphere; the
sustainable use of renewable natural resources; the reduction of
waste and the safe disposal of waste; energy conservation;
greenhouse gas emission reduction; environmental risk reduction
to [Columbia] staff, students and the surrounding community;
and correcting damage, if any; reducing the use of products that
cause environmental damage; and reducing impacts to air quality
in the surrounding area, with a particular sensitivity to the
impacts to people suffering from asthma.127
Among other things, the CBA includes promises to use
energy efficient appliances, mitigate the heat island effect,
reduce storm water runoff, and plant street trees.128

122

Id. at 18–19. Pedestrian-scale design requirements are also included in
the Gateway Center at Terminal Market CBA. Gateway Center CBA, supra
note 97, at 32–33, 35 (providing specifically for street trees, lighting, wide
sidewalks).
123
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 15.
124
Id. at 16; see also Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 7
(providing for way-finding signs).
125
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 16–17.
126
Id. at 14–15.
127
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 32.
128
Id. at 32–33; see also Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 7
(providing for “commercially feasible” development of passive infiltration for
storm water); SunQuest, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT, at 3,
http://www.communitybenefits.org/article.php?id=1474
[hereinafter
SunQuest CBA] (requiring roofs and pavement must be light in color to avoid
the heat island effect); Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 10–11
(ensuring construction of permeable sidewalks).
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3. Community Facilities and
Neighborhood Improvements
Comprehensive plans often contain a community facilities
element that discusses public buildings, infrastructure, and
“those facilities that contribute to the cultural life or physical
and mental health and personal growth of a local government’s
129
residents (e.g., hospitals, clinics, libraries, and arts centers).”
Most CBAs include some type of community amenity that would
fall within this planning area, such as dedicated space and
funding for community centers,130 neighborhood improvements,131
open/public spaces,132 child care facilities133 and medical

129

GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at 7-111.
See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6, 9–10 (5,000
square feet for community nonprofits and community events; $200,000 for a
community center and Vietnamese cultural center); Longfellow CBA, supra
note 95, at 17 (space for public information display, a community room for
meeting, and 500 square feet for nonprofits at reduced rent); Columbia CBA,
supra note 95, at 38–39 (space for Community Board 9); MARLTON SQUARE
REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT DEVELOPER COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROGRAM 3,
available
at
http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/cba_marlton
square.pdf (space for community meetings and other community activities);
Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 11 (commitment to assist YMCA to
develop and sustain a multi-purpose center for youth, family and seniors in
the community); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 28 (developer will
provide child care, youth and senior centers).
131
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 ($50,000 for right of way
improvements); SunQuest CBA, supra note 128, at 4–5 ($150,000 for a
neighborhood improvement fund; youth center).
132
Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-2–3 (needs assessment and $1
million for parks; street level public plaza); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95,
at 16–17 (landscaped public gathering places); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra
note 95, at 30 (6 acres of open space).
133
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 38 (5,000 square feet for a
nonprofit day care center for income eligible families); North Hollywood
Mixed-Use Redevelopment Project, COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROGRAM 2 (Nov.
2001), available at http://amy.m.lavine.googlepages.com/NoHo20CBA.pdf
(developer will build onsite childcare center, find a tenant, and require the
tenant to provide care for at least 50 low-moderate income families).
130
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134

centers. Several CBAs also require the developer to either
market project space to businesses needed by the community,
such as grocery stores and banks,135 or to restrict the availability
of project space to businesses like pawnshops that have been
136
deemed detrimental to the community.
4. Housing
Housing is an important component in both comprehensive
plans137 and CBAs. When CBAs cover projects involving
substantial housing components, they typically require the
developer to build more affordable units than would otherwise
be required.138 As an alternative to including affordable housing

134

See, e.g., Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 39 (funding to expand
existing medical facilities); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 26
(developing a health care center providing comprehensive quality primary
care).
135
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91, at 9 (developer will market space
to traditional banks); Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 8 ($2 million for a
grocery store that must include a pharmacy and a selection of healthy foods);
Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 12 (developer will use good faith
efforts to rent to a grocery store).
136
See Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 7 (no payday lenders or
pawnshops); Pacoima CBA, supra note 95 (no payday lenders); Gateway
Center CBA, supra note 97, at 34 (no Wal-Mart); Ballpark Village CBA,
supra note 92, at 18 (no hotel); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 12–13
(no big boxes or stores that do not accept food stamps); Front Range
Economic Strategy Center, GATES-CHEROKEE REDEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
BENEFITS AGREEMENT (2008), http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/
01/gates-cherokee-redevelopment-cba.html [hereinafter Gates Cherokee CBA]
(no big boxes).
137
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at ch. 4
(housing element).
138
See Steve Brandt, Minneapolis Neighborhood Makes a Deal and
History, STARTRIBUNE.COM, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/
local/16240642.html (noting that the Longfellow Station CBA requires more
affordable housing than the Minneapolis inclusionary zoning ordinance). If a
project is not subject to inclusionary housing minimums, CBAs generally call
for the developer to maximize the amount of affordable housing included in
the project. See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 8 (200 of 400
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within the project, some developers have committed to building
offsite affordable housing in order to mitigate the displacement
and/or gentrification caused by the project.139
Most CBA housing provisions specify levels of housing
affordability and the length of time for which units must remain
140
affordable.
Some provide requirements for the types of
units must be affordable); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-9 (20%
affordable); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (30% affordable housing);
Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (10% of for sale units and 20% of
rental units); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10 (developer will
maximize affordable housing).
139
See, e.g., Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 10 ($20 million for
affordable housing to address the impact of the project); Ballpark Village
CBA, supra note 92, at 11 ($1.5 million for affordable housing in
neighboring communities); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 8 ($27.3
million for a “Community First Housing Fund” to buy market rate properties
inside and outside the project for income eligible residents); Grand Avenue
Committee, GRAND AVENUE COMMUNITY BENEFITS PROJECT (2008),
http://www.
grandavenuecommittee.org/community.html [hereinafter Grand Avenue]
(revolving loan fund of at least $750,000 for affordable housing
development); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-11 ($650,000 revolving loan
fund for affordable housing development).
140
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 (120 of the 200 units must
be affordable at AMI 50% and the other 80 must be affordable at AMI 80%;
50 years affordability); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 7 (providing a
schedule of housing affordability requirements); Grand Avenue, supra note
139 (half of the affordable units will be priced at not more than 80% AMI,
and the other half at 50%; affordability is required for 55 years for rental
units and 45 years for for sale units); Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-10
(30% of affordable units will be for 50% AMI, 35% will be for 51–60%
AMI, and 35% will be for 61–80% AMI; minimum 30 years affordability);
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (20% of all units to be affordable at
50% AMI and 10% to be affordable at 40–60% AMI; affordability required
for 30 years); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (units must remain
affordable for at least 40 years); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10
(average AMI of affordable units can be no more than 47%); Atlantic Yards
CBA, supra note 95, at 24 (units are to be affordable for 30 years); Oak to
Ninth Community Benefits Coalition and the Redevelopment Agency, OAK TO
NINTH COOPERATION AGREEMENT, at 3 (2006) http://www.urbanstrategies.
org/programs/econopp/documents/FinalOaktoNinthCooperationAgreeementwit
hCoalitionfinalexecution.pdf [hereinafter Oak to Ninth CBA] (“[A]ll Project
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affordable units to be included in the development (e.g.,
different unit sizes, rental versus for sale units, senior restricted
housing, etc.)141 and the location of affordable units, both in
relation to the project and in relation to other affordable housing
142
units. Other CBAs give preferences for affordable units to
people displaced by the project, low-income residents or local
143
residents. CBAs may also seek to expedite the construction of
Units shall be provided at no greater than an Affordable Rent to households
earning from 25 percent to 60 percent of Area Median Income for at least 55
years.”).
141
See, e.g., Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 3 (no more than
25% of affordable units can be senior restricted, at least 30% must be threebedroom units, and at least 20% must be two-bedroom units); Longfellow
CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (requiring a mix of studios, and one, two and three
bedroom units); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (requiring 10% of for
sale units and 20% of rentals to be affordable); Dearborn Street CBA, supra
note 91 (requiring 50 units of affordable “family housing”); Ballpark Village
CBA, supra note 92, at 10–11 (some units in the offsite affordable housing
project must be reserved for seniors); Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at
25 (10% of affordable units reserved for seniors); Hunters Point CBA, supra
note 91, at 9–10 (average affordable unit size of 2.5 bedrooms and requiring
some units to be for seniors or disabled residents).
142
See, e.g., Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 7 (prohibiting any one
building from containing more than 65% affordable housing so as “to prevent
a concentration of affordable housing in any particular building in the
development”); Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136 (buildings are to be
inclusionary); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 10 (75% of the
affordable units at one building will be 2 or 3 bedroom units, other building
will be devoted to single rooms and transitional housing); Staples CBA, supra
note 91, at A-10 (affordable units will be either on or offsite, but offsite units
will be within a 3 mile radius); Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 5
(permitting the redevelopment agency to construct a maximum of 77 offsite
affordable units and limiting them to the immediate area).
143
See, e.g., Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-16 (giving priority given
to displaced residents); Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 11 (requiring
that 10% of the restricted units will be targeted to households with at least
one person who has worked in downtown San Diego for one year, 60% shall
be targeted to people from neighboring communities, 30% may be targeted to
anybody); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 9–10 (requiring priority
marketing for the affordable units for existing local residents, displaced
residents, etc.); Grand Avenue, supra note 139 (giving priority for rentals for
displaced residents).
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affordable units by requiring them to be finished before work is
144
started on other parts of the project.
5. Aesthetics and Building Design
Community character is often shaped by a neighborhood’s
“look,” and for this reason, aesthetics and architecture often
145
play a role in community planning. While most CBAs do not
contain detailed aesthetic or design regulations, a number of
CBAs do address specific aesthetic issues. Several include
limitations on signs and blank facades, both of which can give a
community a dull or garish appearance.146 For similar reasons,
the Pacoima Plaza CBA prohibits barred windows,147 the
Peninsula Compost CBA requires project facilities to be
148
screened from view, and the Longfellow Station agreement
prohibits vinyl siding and drive through windows.149
In contrast to these preemptive measures, other CBAs
include provisions intended to affirmatively foster community
character, such as space and funding requirements for public

144

See, e.g., Oak to Ninth CBA, supra note 140, at 5 (requiring
construction of any offsite units to be commenced prior to commercial parts
of the project); Hunters Point CBA, supra note 91, at 7; Dearborn Street
CBA, supra note 91, at 8 (stating the city will not be obligated to grant a
certificate of occupancy for the retail space until the developers can show that
construction has commenced on at least 200 housing units, including at least
80 affordable units; developer agrees that within 4 years of the issuance of
the certificate of occupancy, construction must be commenced on the other
200 units).
145
See GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 7168 to 7-172 (community design element).
146
Gateway Center CBA, supra note 97, at 32 (requiring that there not
be any blank walls); Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6 (requiring
facades of stores are unique and distinct and specific sign restrictions);
Ballpark Village CBA, supra note 92, at 6.
147
Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91, at 7.
148
See also Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (requiring screening
of machinery, loading docks, and trash areas).
149
Id.
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150

art. Recognizing the unique character of Seattle’s Little Saigon
neighborhood, the Dearborn CBA (although the project was later
cancelled151) included $200,000 for the construction of a
Vietnamese cultural center, and provisions intended to help
152
existing small businesses run by Vietnamese merchants.
Similarly, Columbia agreed to preserve several of the
neighborhood’s historic buildings and to help create a multi153
disciplinary historic preservation and development strategy.
“Placemaking” is an important part of the Longfellow
Station CBA. While the design guides are in part intended to
promote walking and transit use, as noted above, they are also
intended to “encourage interaction and connection at a human
scale . . . through creation of a welcoming, safe, and accessible
environment.”154 The project is to “be urban, not suburban, in
feel and function” and buildings must be “designed to have a
pedestrian feel at street level. Scale, massing and relationships
of buildings shall be designed to relate to the users (not
overwhelm the users).”155 Additionally, the project is to be
designed so as to facilitate outdoor dining and shopping, and
high quality exterior building materials are required in order to

150

See, e.g., Pacoima Plaza CBA, supra note 91 (developer will comply
with CRA’s public art policy); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 36 (5,000
square feet of space for use by local artists); Ballpark Village CBA, supra
note 92, at 12 (requires a good faith effort to use local artists); Longfellow
CBA, supra note 95, at 17 (space for public art).
151
Emily Heffter, $300M Project at Seattle Goodwill Site Canceled,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2009116421_webgoodwill24.html.
152
Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 6, 9–10 (70,000 square feet
set aside for small retail stores that each occupy less than 5,000 square feet
and at least 5,000 square feet to one or more non-profit organizations who
primarily provide services to the Vietnamese Community); see also Stuart
Eskenazi, Coalition Talks Reach Deal on Goodwill Site, SEATTLE TIMES,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008152450_dearborn02m.ht
ml.
153
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 39–40.
154
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 18.
155
Id. at 19.
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156

establish “a sense of permanency.”

6. Parking & Traffic
CBAs do not generally include detailed transportation plans,
but some agreements have included provisions relating to
parking, traffic and transit facilities. (Unlike the TOD provisions
described above, which are intended to promote transit and
discourage driving, these transportation requirements are aimed
at mitigating congestion and improving infrastructure.) Examples
of transportation-related community benefits include the
establishment of a residential parking permit program,157 the
construction of additional parking facilities,158 and subway, bus
stop and other infrastructure improvements.159 The Columbia
CBA also authorizes funding for a transportation needs
assessment study, which may cover such issues as public
transportation, parking needs, traffic calming devices, and air
quality.160
7. Small Business Development
Comprehensive plans frequently address economic
development,161 and “[a] growing number of communities are
including in their comprehensive plans an intention to preserve
and strengthen locally owned businesses, limit commercial
development to the downtown or other existing retail districts,

156

Id.
See, e.g., Staples CBA, supra note 91, at A-3.
158
See, e.g., Peninsula Compost CBA, supra note 95, at 4
(neighborhood parking lot); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 36 (adding 72
public parking spaces).
159
See, e.g., Dearborn Street CBA, supra note 91, at 9 ($150,000 for
traffic mitigation); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 35–36 (subway and bus
stop improvements).
160
Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 35.
161
See, e.g., GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1,
at 7-127 to 7-135.
157
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and restrict the proliferation of corporate chains.” With or
without the guidance of such policies, community coalitions have
often sought CBA benefits to encourage the growth of small and
local businesses.
Many CBAs set goals for awarding contracts to local
businesses, and these provisions usually include a preference for
minority and women owned businesses—frequently referred to
as minority-owned business enterprises (“MBEs”), womenowned business enterprises (“WBEs”) or minority-womenowned business enterprises (“MWBEs”).163 CBAs relating to
projects with retail or commercial components have included
space set-asides for small and local businesses164 and in a few
CBAs, big boxes and large chain stores have been effectively
prohibited by retail size caps.165

162

See New Rules, Comprehensive Plans, http://www.newrules.org/
retail/rules/comprehensive-plans (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
163
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 17–18 (goals to
award at least 5% of preconstruction contracts (e.g., architectural,
engineering, legal) to MBEs and 3% to WBEs (by total value of contracts),
goals to award at least 20% of construction contracts to MBEs and 10% to
WBEs (by total value of contracts), with a preference for community based
businesses, goals to award at least 20% of post construction purchasing and
service contracts to MWBEs).
164
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (15% set aside
for small businesses, with below market rents); Dearborn Street CBA, supra
note 91, at 6 (70,000 square feet set aside for small retail stores greater than
5,000 square feet and at least two non-formula businesses); Gateway Center
CBA, supra note 97, at 29 (18,000 square feet for small businesses);
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 12–13 (national chains can occupy no
more than 70% of the project and 10% must be reserved for “community
based small businesses”); San Jose CIM Project Community Benefits
Agreement 121–22 (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.communitybenefits.org/
article.php?id=1476 (goals of 30% San Jose retailers and 30% regional
retailers, with a set aside of 10% of the available retail space for existing
small business in the downtown); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 22
(18,000 square foot set aside for small businesses).
165
See, e.g., Gates Cherokee CBA, supra note 136, at 2 (size cap at
75,000 square feet); Gateway Center CBA, supra note 97 (manuscript at 34)
(no Wal-Mart); Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 19 (large retail cap at
30,000 square feet); Columbia CBA, supra note 95, at 22 (retail rental size
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Other benefits to small and local businesses include low
166
interest loan programs, provisions requiring contracts to be
unbundled (to level the playing field for smaller businesses),167
and programs to better inform local businesses about the
168
project’s business opportunities. The Penguins Arena CBA, for
example, will seek to increase community business involvement
in the project by requiring the developer to notify the coalition
of pre-bid activities and meetings with contractors. Local
business owners will also be invited to business opportunity
workshops provided by the Penguins, which will help them to
take advantage of opportunities for concessions, retail space,
suppliers, vendors and subcontractors.169
IV. DO PRIVATE CBAS USURP THE PUBLIC PLANNING PROCESS?
The inclusion in CBAs of community amenities that resemble
items normally found in comprehensive plans and/or
implementing regulations raises a number of critical community
planning issues that have not yet been addressed.
A. Are CBAs Another Type of Community-Based Plan?
When considered as a whole, CBAs are not synonymous
with comprehensive land use plans or smaller scale communitybased plans. CBAs involve issues not contemplated by planning
documents, such as increased wage requirements, union
neutrality, local hiring goals, and job training programs. These
provisions, moreover, are core issues of the community benefits
movement.170 CBA coalitions also have the potential to
cap at 2,500 square feet).
166
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20; LAX CBA,
supra note 95, at 31 (revolving loan fund for small businesses).
167
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20.
168
See, e.g., Atlantic Yards CBA, supra note 95, at 20–21 (targeted
outreach to local small businesses and “Meet the General Contractor”
meetings, a series of technical assistance workshops for local MWBEs).
169
See Penguins CBA, supra note 93, at 12–13.
170
See, e.g., CommunityBenefits.org, A New Urban Agenda for
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encourage more public participation than traditional planning
processes by building a sense of community empowerment.
Rather than the development of the community vision being
facilitated by a government employed planning staff, CBAs are
usually developed and facilitated by members of the impacted
171
community.
Community-based planning and coalition
organizing have much in common, however, as both seek out
diverse stakeholders using non-conventional outreach techniques.
As project-specific documents, the impact of CBAs is also
spatially limited,172 unlike comprehensive plans, which apply to
America: Rebuild the Middle Class, http://communitybenefits.org/downloads/
A%20New%20Urban%20Agenda%20for%20America.pdf (last visited Oct.
15, 2009) (“The standard menu of progressive urban policy initiatives focuses
on addressing identified needs of poor families by reestablishing the social
safety net and improving job training and education programs. The new
urban agenda adds an important and often missing component by addressing
one of the main causes of urban poverty: the prevalence of low-paying, lowquality employment and the dearth of middle-class job opportunities.”).
171
However, in states where the government is more directly involved
with CBAs, such as in California, the planning staff may be more intimately
involved in the process. For example, staff at the Los Angeles Community
Redevelopment Agency are routinely involved in the development of CBAs.
172
The requirement that CBAs be limited to one development is intended
to distinguish the tool from:
redevelopment plans, general plans, specific plans, zoning laws, and
other land use documents that might encourage or require specified
community benefits for particular geographic areas. This requirement
also excludes from the definition of CBA single-issue policies that
cover a range of projects, such as typical inclusionary housing
policies or local hiring policies.
Gross, supra note 3, at 39. However, legislative CBA provisions may require
multiple developers to provide specific community benefits lobbied for by the
community, as in the Milwaukee Park East Redevelopment Compact. This
document requires the developers of county-owned land to provide living
wages and job training programs, and to use green building techniques. Park
East Redevelopment Compact, supra note 91. See also Amy Lavine,
Milwaukee Park East Redevelopment CBA, COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENTS
BLOG,
http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/
milwaukee-park-east-redevelopment-cba.html (Jan. 3, 2008). Alternatively, a
legislative CBA provision may require multiple developers to negotiate CBAs
in the future. This approach was taken in relation to Atlanta’s Beltline
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all of the residents and businesses in a given city or metropolitan
area. CBAs that involve commitments of planning-related
amenities and accommodations may be placed on the spectrum
close to small-scale comprehensive plans, especially when they
include the types of broad policy statements that are commonly
used to guide community-based plans.
Despite the similarities between CBAs and small-scale
community-based plans, the unregulated CBA negotiation
process should not be permitted to displace thorough and
accountable government planning. In this regard, the CBA for
Atlantic Yards, a proposed arena project and mega-development
located in Brooklyn, has been particularly maligned. The CBA
has demonstrated that specious appearances of community
involvement can legitimate departures from the normal planning
process when, in fact, the CBA’s effect may be to make
development projects less accountable, less transparent, and
more exclusionary than they otherwise would be.
In the case of Atlantic Yards, the project’s government
partner, a state economic development authority, overrode all of
the local zoning and planning laws in order to expedite the
development.173 As a result, the project’s approval was left
primarily to the state authority’s unelected board,174 with no city

project, requiring developers that accept financial incentives to “reflect,
through the development agreements or funding agreements that accompany
such projects, certain community benefit principles[.]” ATLANTA, GA.,
ORDINANCE 05-O-1733 § 19 (2005).
173
Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perils of Community Benefits
Agreements, PLANETIZEN, May 5, 2007, http://www.planetizen.com/node/
24335. Authority for the override of local zoning and planning laws is found
in the New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 6255 (2006).
174
The project also required a land deal with the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, another unelected authority, as well as approvals
from the Public Authorities Control Board (“PACB”), which does include
several representatives from the state legislature. See N.Y. State Gov’t
website, About the Public Authorities Control Board, http://www.budget.
state.ny.us/agencyGuide/pacb/aboutPACB.html. The PACB’s role is limited,
however, to approving project financing; it is not authorized to make
planning and development decisions.
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officials ever having had a chance to review the project and
175
condition or reject it. The CBA, moreover, was finalized
before an environmental impact statement had been prepared for
the project, meaning that the CBA signatories may have been
176
unaware of the extent of the project’s impacts.
The Atlantic Yards CBA does include promises of significant
community amenities, such as hundreds of affordable housing
units, open space, job training, and a health center, but it has
been widely criticized as being unrepresentative of the
community.177 Negotiations were conducted secretly, with many
175

Normally, the city’s uniform land use review process would give local
community boards, the borough president, the planning commission, and the
city council a chance to review the development application. New York City
Dept. of City Planning, The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
176
The Atlantic Yards CBA was signed in 2005. Atlantic Yards CBA,
supra note 95, at 1. The EIS was adopted in 2006. New York State’s Empire
State Development, Atlantic Yards Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(DEIS)—July 18, 2006, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects/
Data/AtlanticYards/AdditionalResources/AYDEIS/AYDEIS.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010). FEIS was adopted on November 27, 2006. New York State’s
Empire State Development, Atlantic Yards Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS)—Corrected and Amended November 27, 2006,
http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects/Data/AtlanticYards/Addi
tionalResources/AYFEIS/AYFEIS.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
177
Only eight community groups joined the CBA coalition, as compared
to the more than 50 groups that are opposed to the project. Develop—Don’t
Destroy Brooklyn, The Opposition, http://dddb.net/php/opposition.php (last
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (listing opposition groups). Testimony made on behalf
of Good Jobs New York recognized that “[p]erhaps the most striking is that
elsewhere CBAs are negotiated by one broad coalition of groups that would
otherwise oppose a project, a coalition that includes labor and community
organizations representing a variety of interests . . . . In the BAY [Brooklyn
Atlantic Yards] case, several groups, all of which have publicly supported the
project already, have each engaged in what seem to be separate negotiations
on particular issues.” Public Hearing of the New York City Council Comm.
on Econ. Dev. on the Proposed Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project (May 26,
2005) (comments of Bettina Damiani, Project Dir., Good Jobs New York),
available at http://www.goodjobsny.org/testimony_bay_5_05.htm [hereinafter
Damiani testimony]; see also Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Where is
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stakeholders excluded, and all of the coalition community groups
178
have received funding from the developer. Additionally, some
of the most important commitments in the agreement are likely
179
unenforceable.
For the community groups that were not given a chance to
participate in defining the developer’s public responsibilities—
180
and there are many such groups —the CBA was a wholly
the Community in “CBA”?, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.dddb.net/php/
latestnews_Linked.php?id=696.
178
See, e.g., Damiani testimony, supra note 177, (“The negotiations
surrounding the development of the BAY project have been marked by
secrecy . . . . Unsurprisingly, this process has contributed to a fragmentation
of community responses, as some groups have been able to work with the
‘designated developer’ to advance their concerns while others have not.”);
Jess Wisloski, Ratner Invites Chosen Few to Draft Agreement, BROOKLYN
PAPER, Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/38/
27_38nets2.html (discussing the secrecy and exclusivity of CBA
negotiations); Norman Oder, Atlantic Yards Process a “Modern Blueprint”?
Only if the Times Ignores the Evidence, TIMES RATNER REPORT, Oct. 13,
2005, http://timesratnerreport.blogspot.com/2005/10/atlantic-yards-processmodern.html) (calling the Atlantic Yards and its CBA “a national model in
public manipulation and broken promises”); Norman Oder, With $1.5M
Grant/Loan, FCR Bails Out National ACORN, Parent of Major CBA Partner,
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Dec. 2, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.
com/2008/12/with-15m-grantloan-fcr-bails-out.html (reporting that the
developer gave one of the CBA signatories a $1.5 million bailout); Norman
Oder, AY CBA Witness Bloomberg Blasts CBAs as Extortion; Signatory
Nimmons Brushes off Questions from The Local, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT,
Aug. 26, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/ay-cbawitness-bloomberg-blasts-cbas-as.html (“On July 22, Forest City Ratner
executive Mary Anne Gilmartin confirmed at a public meeting that the
developer provides funds to all of the signatories of the Community Benefits
Agreement.”).
179
See, e.g., Norman Oder, More Criticism of the Atlantic Yards
Community Benefits Agreement: It (Mostly) Doesn’t Apply if Ratner Sells the
Project, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar. 30, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport
.blogspot.com/2009/03/more-criticism-of-atlantic-yards.html (explaining that
many provisions in the CBA would not apply if the developer were to sell the
project). Additionally, it is not clear that the CBA, and especially its
affordable housing promises, would be enforceable if only the arena were to
be built.
180
See, e.g., The Opposition, supra note 177 (listing opposition groups).
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inadequate substitute for the city’s land use review process, even
181
if that process is not ideal for large scale developments. As
urban planning professor Lance Freeman has explained:
While the CBA does at least give some of the most
disenfranchised residents an opportunity to reap some
benefits from the project . . . there is no mechanism to
insure that the “community” in a CBA is representative
of the community. If the signatories to the CBA were
simply viewed as another interest group, that might be
ok. But the CBA is being presented as illustrative of the
development’s community input. Public officials are
posing for pictures with the developer and signatories to
the CBA, giving the impression that the community had
significant input into the planning [of] Atlantic Yards.
This is not necessarily the case.
[T]he CBA . . . cannot be viewed as a substitute for a
true planning process that includes community input. If a
developer is proposing a project that will unduly burden

181

See, e.g., Norman Oder, Catching Up with Coney Island: How CBAlike Trade-offs May Have Sacrificed the Amusement Area, ATLANTIC YARDS
REPORT, Aug. 7, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/
catching-up-with-coney-island-how-cba.html (noting that the city’s uniform
land use review process failed to “resolve opposing views” regarding the
Coney Island rezoning); Norman Oder, Flashback, 2005: Roger Green Says
AY Area “Not Blighted;” Academic Says AY a Far Cry from Times Square
Blight, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Feb. 19, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.
blogspot.com/2009/02/flashback-2005-roger-green-says-ay-area.html (quoting
state Assemblyman Daniel O’Donnell as calling the city’s planning review
process a “horse and pony show” because the city council often ignores the
recommendations of local community boards); Norman Oder, HPD Official
Says Development Trade-offs Should Be Transparent (and Implicitly Indicts
the AY Approval Process), ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Nov. 7, 2008,
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/11/hpd-official-says-development
-trade.html (quoting an official from the city Department of Housing
Preservation as explaining that “ULURP is awfully late to start a
conversation about a large project. It’s one thing if you’re talking about a
small project, and you’re going to tweak a floor . . . or affordability,
slightly. If you’re talking about a large-scale project, ULURP is simply too
late to really have that dialogue”).
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the community, exacting benefits in exchange for
tolerating these burdens is fine idea. Ideally, this would
be done as part of a democratic planning process. When
negotiated by private organizations, however, this is
symptomatic of a flawed planning process. When CBAs
are used in place of an inclusive planning process they
run the risk of legitimating the very process they are
supposed to counteract, planning and development that
182
disenfranchises.
Since the Atlantic Yards CBA was signed in 2005, public
officials involved in the Atlantic Yards development have
admitted that the project should have gone through the local
planning process.183 Mayor Bloomberg, who enthusiastically
endorsed the CBA in 2005 has now come full circle, stating that
he is “violently opposed to community benefits agreements” and
that a “small group of people, [who] feather their own
nests. . . [and] extort money from the developer” is “just not
good government.”184 Even the developer has removed the CBA
182

Freeman, supra note 173 (emphasis added); see also Norman Oder,
Push for AY Development Trust Begins; How Much Power Would it Have?,
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, June 17, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.
com/2008/06/push-for-ay-development-trust-begins.html (quoting a city
council member as remarking that “[t]he fundamental mistake that was made
here, really the original [mistake] of this project, is that it was approved in a
way that went around all the usual process[es] for approving a big project . .
. . We never had a chance to fix all the problems.”); Norman Oder,
ACORN’s Lewis Gets Fiery as “Affordable Housing” Debate Heats Up,
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar. 1, 2006, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.
com/2006/03/acorns-lewis-gets-fiery-as-affordable.html (commenting on the
controversy that the CBA and the lack of local review has engendered, law
professor Vicki Been opined that “[o]ne of the take home messages is we
need to use this opportunity to figure out how to fix the [planning] system
more broadly so we’re not having these kinds of fights later in the year or
decades”).
183
See, e.g., Norman Oder, After Doctoroff Admits AY Should’ve Gone
Through ULURP, Will Bloomy, Burden Follow?, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT,
Dec. 12, 2007, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/12/after-doctor
off-admits-ay-shouldve-gone.html.
184
Norman Oder, AY CBA Witness Bloomberg Blasts CBAs as Extortion;
Signatory Nimmons Brushes Off Questions from The Local, ATLANTIC YARDS
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185

from its website, which at one point prominently displayed
186
information about the project’s community benefits.
This CBA experience is used to demonstrate that not all
CBAs are “textbook” illustrations of the true benefits of
meaningful CBA processes and results. In some cases, it is
possible that the CBA framework could provide a viable
alternative to more conventional planning techniques. But, as
illustrated by this example, such a process is susceptible to
capture and manipulation.
B. Do CBAs Advance Narrow Interests at the Expense of the
Larger Community?
While comprehensive land use plans are designed to benefit
the community as a whole, and community-based plans are
generally intended to be incorporated into more general planning
documents, CBAs are negotiated to benefit small neighborhoods
within a metropolitan area. Because of their targeted focus, it
has occasionally been contended that CBA coalitions divert
resources for themselves at the expense of the larger
community. When projects covered by CBAs receive significant
public subsidies, as they often do, this perception is all the more
187
heightened.
REPORT, Aug. 26, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/08/aycba-witness-bloomberg-blasts-cbas-as.html.
185
See Barclay’s Center Brooklyn, http://www.barclayscenter.com (last
visited Oct. 14, 2009).
186
The developer, in fact, touted the CBA in many of the project’s
promotional materials. See, e.g., Norman Oder, In Seventh Slick Brochure,
Forest City Ratner Touts “Historic” CBA, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, Mar.
3, 2008, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/03/in-seventh-slickbrochure-forest-city.html (discussing a brochure calling the CBA “historic”).
187
See Matthew Schuerman, The C.B.A. at Atlantic Yards: But Is It
Legal?, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/
34377 (“Carl Weisbrod, the former president of the city Economic
Development Corporation, criticized the use of CBA’s in projects that receive
public funds—one of which is Atlantic Yards—as fundamentally
undemocratic. ‘If the public is putting money into the project and the
developer is allocating that money in private deals with the community, it is
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CBA supporters have made persuasive arguments against this
premise, explaining that CBAs can produce social and economic
goods that ultimately benefit their surrounding regions. As
explained by the Partnership for Working Families, a national
organization that promotes CBAs, “Community benefits tools
maximize returns on local government investments . . . .
Community benefits programs can transform regions through
stronger, more equitable economies . . . . The community
benefits model works for developers, too . . . . Public input
results in better projects that benefit the whole community . . . .
Community benefits are part of a smart growth agenda.”188
Indeed, the CBA framework is inherently pro-development, and
it can help to obtain project approvals where NIMBYism might
otherwise prevail.189 Additionally, CBAs, like development
agreements,190 can add a measure of certainty to development
projects by setting up mechanisms to resolve community
concerns that might arise during buildout, before they ripen into
public opposition or litigation.191
As with the question of whether CBAs distort the planning

not government setting the priorities. Generally speaking, it is city taxpayer
dollars that are being spent in not necessarily high priority areas,’ he said. ‘It
shouldn’t be some local community groups making these decisions. It should
be a cross-section of the community and city government.’”).
188
THE PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS:
PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR PROACTIVE DEVELOPMENT 3, available at
http://communitybenefits.org/downloads/CB%20Tools%20for%20Proactive%
20Development.pdf.
189
See, e.g., id. at 3 (“CBA advocates are pro-growth . . . . Once an
agreement is achieved, the developer can feel confident that they [sic] have
real community support [for] the project, easing the approvals process for
everyone.”).
190
See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Forming a Tie That Binds: Development
Agreements in Georgia and the Need for Legislative Clarity, 30 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 8–9 (2006) (explaining how development
agreements provide certainty in the land development process).
191
Most CBAs provide for mediation and/or binding arbitration in the
case of a dispute between the coalition and the developer. See, e.g.,
Longfellow CBA, supra note 95, at 24 (mediation); LAX CBA, supra note
95, at 33 (arbitration).
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process and produce counterproductive results, the effect of a
CBA on the allocation of metropolitan resources will vary
depending on the circumstances surrounding its adoption and the
terms that it embraces. A CBA that is negotiated by a
historically disempowered community for a development that
will have significant negative impacts will advance equity and
fairness goals, rather than inhibit them. But other situations can
be easily imagined in which CBAs could lead to private
windfalls and misallocations of public and private resources.
While this has not been a problem in California, the New York
CBAs have not demonstrated as much integrity.
One situation in which CBAs may lead to windfall benefits
occurs when coalition community groups receive a direct
financial benefit in exchange for their support of a project. This
occurred in relation to the Atlantic Yards CBA, as noted above.
The director of the Partnership for Working Families,
responding to this situation, stated: “[a]s a matter of principle,
groups in our network don’t take money from developers. We
192
want to avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest . . . .”
Ideals may be important to the community benefits movement,
but without conflict of interest regulations to protect the integrity
of CBAs, the movement will continue to be susceptible to
developer-coalition collusion.
It is also possible that communities could demand excessive
benefits from developers eager to obtain public support and
quick project approvals. While there is nothing unlawful about
this in the context of a purely private agreement, especially
where the community will suffer definite and negative
development impacts, the effect that such a CBA may have on
government decision-makers raises ethical and constitutional
problems. Ethical considerations come into play where coalitions
are used as a proxy for politicians seeking particular community
amenities for specific constituent groups. Again, the trouble has

192

Norman Oder, Conflict of Interest? $350K to CBA Signatories Shows
Departure From L.A. Model, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, June 8, 2006,
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2006/06/conflict-of-interest-350k-tocba.html.

SALKIN REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 11:32 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

206

been caused by New York CBAs, and similar sorts of
agreements even prompted a New York City Bar Association
report in 1988. The report unequivocally counseled against
permitting CBA-type deals:
The ad hoc payment of money or services in return for
favorable governmental action also adversely affects the
decision-making process. In egregious cases, the decision
maker is corrupted. In less egregious cases, satisfying the
wish list for a borough president, community board or a
mayor enhances the recipient’s political power. The
decision-maker may accept the project in order to get the
unrelated amenities, when perhaps it should be voted
down. Thus integrity is eroded, of the government in
general and of the zoning laws and land use regulations
in particular.193
These ethical concerns also contribute to the reasoning
behind the Supreme Court’s doctrine prohibiting development
exactions,194 which “has its roots in the allegations of coercion
and illicit motive that long have animated judicial and academic
debate about exactions and more generally, about the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”195 Development agreements
permit local governments to avoid the exactions ban by
negotiating for developer concessions, usually traded for a
guarantee that zoning and land use regulations will not be
changed in a manner that prevents successive phases of a
project. Because these agreements are voluntary, development
approvals are not considered to be conditioned on the provision
of development amenities, even if this is the de facto (and often
desired) result.196 Local governments are currently authorized to

193

Matthew Schuerman, C.B.A.’s: Coming to a Bar Near You, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/34098.
194
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
195
Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
473, 475 (1991).
196
See generally Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 85.
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enter into development agreements in about a dozen states, but
such arrangements have also been upheld in states where no
statutory authority for development agreements exists, as in
197
Texas and Massachusetts. In some states where development
agreements have not been approved, either by statute or judicial
fiat, the development process is often dominated by other types
of negotiated agreements between developers and planning
entities, often resulting from environmental mitigation measures
where local environmental review occurs.
The problem with unauthorized and unregulated bilateral
government-developer negotiations is that they open up the
possibility that “‘needy’ cities and towns [may] see their zoning
powers as for sale to the highest bidder.”198 And where this is
the case, short term economic goals may be just as likely to
motivate local government decision makers as are the types of
social and environmental policies that require foresight and long199
term planning. In the states that have enacted development
agreement statutes, on the other hand, the comprehensive plan
acts as a safeguard to ensure that development agreements
further the community’s broad goals and policies for future
development.200 States such as California, which require
consistency between zoning and the comprehensive plan, also
require consistency in the negotiation of development
agreements. The development agreement framework has also
allowed planning agencies, community organizations and
197

See Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 340, 338–39 (discussing
recent Massachusetts cases that “conclude that a promise by a petitioner is
different from a requirement imposed as a condition precedent by the
municipality”); Kent, Jr., supra note 190, at 6, n.25 (2006) (citing cases
permitting development agreements in the absence of enabling legislation
from Alabama, Nebraska, and New Mexico).
198
See Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 338.
199
See Camacho II, supra note 54, at 271 (“While modern bilateral
negotiation attempts to address some of the intrinsic inefficiencies of the
traditional command and control approach . . . bilateral negotiation
approaches promote adversarial and self-interested behavior while ignoring
the long-term community engagement that is essential to the legitimacy of
local decision-making processes.”).
200
Curtin & Witten, supra note 24, at 345.
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developers to work together in building CBAs, while in other
states local governments have struggled to determine where they
fit into the CBA process.
Four New York CBAs have been negotiated to date, relating
to Atlantic Yards, the Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal
Market, Yankee Stadium, and the expansion of Columbia
201
University. In each of these cases, the lack of strong and
inclusive community coalitions and the amount of influence
wielded by public officials suggests that there were, at the very
least, opportunities for this sort of bargaining away of the city’s
comprehensive planning goals.202
201

See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 83, at 308–17.
Atlantic Yards continues to be promoted with much zeal by the
Empire State Development Corporation, even though its public benefits have
decreased substantially since the project was approved in 2006. Frank Gehry
is no longer the architect, for example; the project’s affordable housing
component has been significantly delayed; and a renegotiated land deal with
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has resulted in an arguably less
valuable package for the authority (and for New York City subway riders). In
May 2009, the New York City Independent Budget Office (“IBO”) concluded
that changes in the project’s commercial component and increased subsidies
rendered the arena a net money loser for the city. See Norman Oder, Senate
Hearing: No Tough Questions for ESDC, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, May 29,
2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2009/05/senate-hearing-no-tou
gh-questions-for.html. Despite this revelation, and despite increasingly loud
calls for more transparency in the project, the Empire State Development
Corporation refuses to release its updated cost-benefit analysis until after the
project’s next board approval. As a result, the public will not get a chance to
comment on the situation. What’s more, while refusing to provide a
meaningful response to serious allegations that the project may no longer be
in the public’s best interest, ESDC has “not looked closely at that [the IBO’s]
report.” Norman Oder, ESDC, FCR Face, Answer, Evade Tough Questions,
ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT, July 23, 2009, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.
com/2009/07/esdc-fcr-face-answer-evade-tough.html.
In the Bronx, it was revealed last year that the mayor’s office had
pressured the Yankees to provide a free luxury suite for the mayor and other
high-ranking officials. State Senator Richard Brodsky, who has been urging
reforms, asked “what is the public interest here and who’s protecting it?”
David W. Chen, City Pressed for Use of Yankee Luxury Suite, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/nyregion/
30stadium.html. The project has been riddled with other controversies, from
202
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In states that do not allow development agreements, the
exactions issue also raises the question of the most appropriate
way for public officials to react when faced with a developer
that refuses to negotiate a CBA with a strong and broadly
inclusive CBA coalition: the local official can become involved
in CBA negotiations and try to persuade the developer into
negotiating, which might raise exactions problems if that
persuasion amounts to coercion; or she can remain on the
sidelines and hope that the parties reach a deal. In Pittsburgh,
the mayor and county executive became very involved in
negotiations for the Penguins CBA, to the point where they
committed $1 million in matching funds to help secure a grocery
store and YMCA for the community. Both of these facilities are
sorely needed in the underserved community located near the
arena site, and the CBA coalition was one of the largest and
most inclusive coalitions formed to date. In short, this was an
ideal situation for the negotiation of a CBA. But the city has
changed its tune toward CBAs since its legal department
concluded that “[w]hile [CBAs] could provide benefits to the
community, they are simply not a part of what the Planning
Commission may consider when reviewing master-development
plans and project-development plans.”203

a U.S. Congressional inquiry to its tax-exempt bonding scheme (which
resulted in an IRS move to close certain loopholes), to an 18-month delay in
implementing the CBA. With the old Yankee Stadium still standing after 311
days, preventing the construction of parks to replace the ones covered over
by the new stadium, some people have begun referring to the “Yankee
Stadium Death Watch.” Neil deMause, Yankee Stadium Death Watch: Day
331, N.Y. NEWS BLOG, http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/
2009/08/yankee_stadium_3.php. With problems such as these it seems fair to
inquire into the propriety of the CBA, which was completed with no
community participation and which is very likely unenforceable.
The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market and the Columbia
University expansion have both raised controversies of their own, but their
CBAs have received less criticism.
203
Chris Togneri, Updated North Shore Plan Approved, PITTSBURG
TRIBUNE REV., June 10, 2009, http://pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/pittsburgh/s_628882.html. See also Oro Valley Town Council Minutes,
Regular Session, Aug. 27, 2008 (“Town Attorney Tobin Rosen explained that
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C. How Should a Local Government Respond if a CBA is
Inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan?
To the extent that CBAs cover land use and community
development issues, they may produce a different vision for the
neighborhood than the vision articulated in a legally adopted
comprehensive plan covering the entire community. A recent
example from the Bronx highlights how CBA provisions can
conflict with government planning efforts in this manner. The
Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance (“KARA”), the
first truly inclusive grassroots CBA coalition in New York City,
raised this problem in the summer of 2009 when, during
negotiations, it demanded a ban on new grocery stores in the
development. To some community members, the provision was
intended to protect existing businesses and the jobs they
provided; but to others, the ban was viewed as interfering with
the community’s need for grocery stores with more healthy and
organic food.204 For the redevelopment project to proceed, the
205
site will need to be rezoned to C4-4 —a general commercial
designation consistent with the comprehensive plan206 that
typically permits grocery and other retail food stores.207
Accordingly, the CBA poses the question of whether local
groups should be able to modify generally applicable zoning
these agreements are great if neighbors and developers are willing to agree to
it. He pointed out that the Town cannot require the agreement if the
developer meets the requirements of the Zoning Code.”).
204
Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/
realestate/commercial/30armory.html?_r=1.
205
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SHOPS AT THE ARMORY PROJECT Fig.
S-4, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/downloads/pdf/08DME004X/08DME004
X_FEIS/08DME004X_FEIS_00_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
206
The Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance Proposal Fig. S-4,
S-6, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oec/downloads/pdf/08DME004X/08DME004X
_FEIS/08DME004X_FEIS_00_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
207
NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, ZONING RESOLUTION 534
(2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/allarticles.pdf.
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regulations via private agreement, even if the city has
specifically decided to apply those general regulations to the
site. Although in many cases this type of use restriction would
resemble a simple restrictive covenant, the city in the
Kingsbridge case must implicitly approve any CBA related to
the development because of the extensive subsidies being given
208
to the developer. Can the city with one hand apply a uniform,
general regulation, and with the other approve a private pact
limiting the reach of the general law?
Another hypothetical could be imagined where a
comprehensive plan and implementing land use regulation
articulates a preference for recreational facilities in designated
areas, but such facilities are not planned for a neighborhood
where a coalition has just negotiated a private CBA to include a
neighborhood park. Such a CBA could be viewed as inconsistent
with the comprehensive plan, raising the question of who speaks
for the neighborhood. A core principle of the social justice
movement is that the community speaks for itself. What then, is
the appropriate role of the government? If in fact the community
coalition is representative of the views of the neighborhood it
purports to represent, and where the neighborhood, speaking
through its coalition representatives expresses the desire for a
certain amenity that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan,
whether the coalition and the project sponsor should legally
agree to the amenity may be an open question. Going back to
the notion that the local government is responsible for the
development, adoption and implementation of the comprehensive
plan, where a CBA contains items that are inconsistent with that
plan, should the locality view the CBA as public input and begin
a process to amend the plan and regulations to make them
consistent with such views? Or should the government refuse to
amend the comprehensive plan, thereby preventing the project

208

See, e.g., Ivonne Salazar, Live Blogging From Armory IDA Hearing:
Tax Breaks Approved, Land Use Review to Begin, BRONX NEWS NETWORK,
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.bronxnewsnetwork.org/2009/03/live-bloggingfrom-armory-ida-hearing_11.html (discussing the last phase of the project
going through the city’s land use review process).
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sponsor from fulfilling its promises? This is a critical question
for all private parties involved in the negotiation of a CBA.
Legally binding CBAs arguably should not be entered into where
one party lacks the legal ability to deliver on a promise, given
that such situations are susceptible to manipulation and bad faith.
Across the country there is a wide disparity as to the level of
government involvement in the development and “acceptance”
of CBAs as a condition of development approval. As noted
above, local governments in California are likely to be at least
tangentially involved in CBA negotiations. In these cases, the
government’s involvement may lead to information for the
parties indicating that land use related terms of the CBA may
not be enforceable absent an adjustment to current planning
documents and regulations.
In states such as New York, where the government is not
involved in purely private CBA negotiations, or at least is better
advised not to be, the municipality must decide how, if at all, it
should embrace the community coalition’s articulated desires for
certain community amenities that are not currently part of the
land use regulatory regime. At a minimum, the planning
department within the municipality will be on notice that the
needs of certain sections of the community are not being met by
the overall plan and vision for the community as a whole. This
information should be the basis for a re-evaluation of the
comprehensive plan—either specific aspects of the plan or the
plan as a whole—to make sure that the plan and its
implementing regulations are serving the best interests of the
jurisdiction as a whole. Nevertheless, as explained above,
conditioning project approvals on criteria not included in the
zoning ordinances or comprehensive plan may, if coercive
enough, make the action unlawful.
Further support for the notion that CBAs should inform and
influence the comprehensive planning process, which should be
ongoing and continuously evolving, is that the methodology used
for the development of a CBA tends to be more inclusive than
that used for the development of a comprehensive plan, at least
where no community-based planning programs exist. The
protocols used in coalition building for the purposes of
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negotiating a CBA, including the consensus building process for
articulating community desires, are more empowering than the
typical opportunities for public participation in the development
and implementation of a comprehensive plan.
While it can be argued that local governments give up
planning authority by yielding to the community desires
expressed in CBAs that are inconsistent with the existing plan, it
may be better viewed as the government doing exactly what it is
supposed to be doing—viewing the planning process as ongoing
and engaging public involvement.
CONCLUSIONS
When CBAs are negotiated by broad based, inclusive
coalitions that are truly representative of community interests,
and such agreements result in a community planning vision that
dramatically differs from the existing traditional comprehensive
plan and implementing regulations for the area, it indicates that
existing governmental planning processes may be inadequate,
and the most appropriate action for a local government to take
209
may be to reform the way that it plans. As described above, a
new paradigm of community-based planning and environmental
justice has emerged that places an increased focus on
209

See Oro Valley Town Council Minutes, Regular Session, Aug. 27,
2008, available at http://lexicon.orovalleyaz.gov/ACK/ArchiveSearch/
ArchiveSearch.htm (select Option 2; search minutes; enter date 08/27/08;
select study session) (“Bill Adler, Town resident and member of the Planning
& Zoning Commission presented information about Community Benefit
Agreements. He explained that the current process of meeting with
neighborhoods and developers could be formalized, bridging communication
between neighbors, the Town and developers. He explained the importance of
citizens first meeting without the applicant so they can be educated on the
development review process, Zoning Code and entitlements and where effect
of change can take place on the development so that they have an
understanding of the process before meeting with the developer. Terry
Parish, Town resident, encouraged the Council to formalize the process so
that developers know upfront that the goal is to come to an agreement with
neighbors and require neighbors to be educated on the development
process.”).
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transparency,
accountability,
and
meaningful
public
participation, within the existing planning process. As explained
by law professor Alejandro Esteban Camacho, there are four
underlying reasons for developing more participatory planning
models:
(1) that an open negotiation process can thwart the
corruption and unfair dealing so closely associated with
conventional negotiated land use regulation; (2) that
participatory processes are necessary to obtain important
information about the interests and preferences of
affected parties; (3) that fostering meaningful
participation has a positive impact on both participants’
and the general public’s satisfaction with the regulatory
process and outcomes; and (4) that direct participation
serves the important goal of enhancing accountability for
governmental services and decisions.210
In California, local governments have responded to CBA
campaigns by working closely with community groups and
consistently incorporating CBAs into development agreements.
The result, more often than not, has been an improved planning
process for all parties. In New York and the many other states
where development agreements have not been formally
authorized, either by statute or judicial order, the CBA model is
less ideal for fostering this type of collaboration. Other ways
must be found to educate the public about the development
process and make it more transparent, democratic and
accountable.
Fortunately, local governments and planning commissions
already have the tools to improve the way that planning
decisions are made. To list just a few methods to encourage
community-based planning, local governments can:
(1) make planning information easily accessible online
and at designated public facilities in all communities and
neighborhoods;
(2) provide hearing notices that are actually designed to

210

Camacho II, supra note 54, at 279.
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reach impacted community members, rather than the
211
“rudimentary public notice” mandated by state or local
law;
(3) hold hearings in locations close to impacted
neighborhoods and at times of day when community
members are likely to be available;
(4) hold additional public meetings, workshops, and other
events in order to reach a diverse cross section of
community members;
(5) partner with existing neighborhood associations, civic
organizations, and faith based entities which typically
have established community networks;
(6) make clear that planners will be responsive to
neighborhood residents’ concerns and desires regarding
future growth; and
(7) express a commitment to ensure that communitybased planning is an integral part of the planning process
and will, to the greatest extent practical, be incorporated
into the comprehensive plan.
Development controversies can also be headed off by
including the community in discussions about proposed projects
early enough in the process so that impacted stakeholders can
help to shape project plans. Too often, communities do not get a
chance to participate in the planning process until the developer
has already worked out its financials and the local government
has invested substantial resources in preliminary planning
reviews, making it likely that the project’s fate has already been
decided. The CBA movement has clearly demonstrated the
importance of having a system in place whereby community
members can feel that they play an important role not just in the
planning process, but also in the development review process.
Especially in those states that do not permit development
agreements, leaving community involvement unregulated in the
hands of private developers carries substantial risks that the
CBA concept will be co-opted, abused, or ignored. Recognizing
211

Id. at 279–80.
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this, local governments, as part of
comprehensive planning function, should
developing alternative planning processes
community benefits movement’s goals
democracy, and accountability.

their continuous
be proactive in
that advance the
of inclusiveness,

